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1. The great diversity of infrastructure charging systems across modes of transport and
Member States undermines the efficiency and the sustainability of Europe’s transport system.
There are currently nine different charging systems for railway infrastructure, with cost
recovery ratios varying between 0% and 100%. Vehicle tax and road charging systems are
also fundamentally different; for example annual vehicle taxes on trucks differ by up to 3000
ECU and only four Member States levy tolls on significant parts of their motorway network.
Similarly the treatment in terms of VAT imposition and energy taxation differ widely across
modes and between Member States. Moreover, charges are seldom levied at the point of use
and they are generally not related to environmental or other “external” costs. As a result users
are currently given only limited incentives to adjust transport patterns and technologies to
reduce costs and infrastructure managers seldom receive sufficient revenues from direct user
charges to fund investment.
2. This situation gives rise to significant distortions of competition within and between
modes, often on the basis of the nationality of the transport provider. It also limits the
incentives to cut environmental costs and holds back the efficient provision of infrastructure.
3. The variety of problems thrown up by the diversity of approaches to infrastructure
charging cannot be adequately treated in isolation from each other. That is why the
Commission considers that a gradual and progressive harmonisation of charging principles in
all major commercial modes of transport is required across the Community to deal with these
problems. It is proposed that the charging system be based on the “user pays” principle, i.e. all
users of transport infrastructure should pay for the costs, including environmental and other
external impacts, they impose, at, or as close as possible to the point of use. It is important to
note that changes to charges are not automatically reflected in final transport prices, as
commercial operators may adjust their use to lower their costs. Moreover, Member States can
obviously continue to support the provision of public services or services in the general
interest through subsidies to transport operators using the infrastructure, thereby off-setting
effects on prices paid by final consumers. They can also directly compensate infrastructure
managers for wider benefits (e.g. improved land use planning) that the provision of
infrastructure generates for non-users. Finally, the principles do not impose a centralised
Community charging scheme. Rather, they provide a framework within which Member States
would be free to set charging levels. The “marginal social cost” charging principle should
enhance both the efficiency and the sustainability of the transport system. With this broad
framework in place, it is possible to address specific problems effectively.
4. This approach would have to be phased in gradually in order to give transport users
and providers time to adjust. The Commission, therefore, proposes a step-by-step approach to
implementation, to be accompanied by an advisory committee from Member States experts
and with the full involvement of all stakeholders. The Committee could begin its work on the
basis of the available evidence, allowing the first steps towards the full introduction of the
principles to be taken during the first phase. This phase, to run until 2000, would see the
introduction of charging systems in rail and airports, currently under discussion,
complementing the charging system in road haulage and ensuring that a broadly compatible
structure is in place in the main modes of transport. Charging of external costs on the basis of
an agreed Community framework would be allowed but total charging levels would be capped
by average infrastructure costs (which is the current rule). The second phase would see agreater harmonisation and adaptation of charging systems, especially for heavy goods vehicles
and rail transport where a kilometre based charging system, differentiated on the basis of
vehicle and geographical characteristics would be instituted, and in the ports sector where a
charging framework would be introduced. As of this period charges should not exceed
marginal social costs (including external costs). It would be for the Member States to decide
on how to use the revenues. Obvious alternatives are to allocate funds to the infrastructure
operators, to the general budget – for example to restructure existing taxes - , or to earmark
some revenues for infrastructure funds, possibly multimodal, on national, regional or city
levels. In addition, where new transport charging systems are introduced existing transport
charges will have to be amended and/or phased out The third phase would see an updating of
the Community framework in the light of experience gained during the first two phases.
5. This charging principle would lead to a much higher degree of cost recovery from
users by the infrastructure manager (although this would not necessarily represent an
additional cost to users, since it could be offset by reductions in existing transport charges)
and should therefore facilitate the provision and financing of additional infrastructure. In
combination with the subsidies paid by Member States directly to Infrastructure managers to
compensate for wider social benefits to non-transport users, this is likely to lead to a high,
possibly complete, recovery of infrastructure capital costs at the level of the transport system
as a whole. Should full recovery not be reached and should Member States wish to arrive at a
higher level of cost recovery, then the Commission considers that this should be done through
the imposition of additional non-discriminatory and non-distorting fixed user charges.
Moreover, at least in the short to medium term, there are likely to be investment projects
where higher levels of cost recovery are required from users of these projects. In these cases,
higher charges would be allowed for a sufficient period of time, subject to Community rules
safeguarding non-discrimination and ensuring that no monopoly profits are made. In
summary, the charging principles proposed in this paper, necessary for efficient use of
infrastructure networks, would also create the conditions for financing infrastructure from user
contributions that could accommodate different financing models. In view of the strongly
diverging infrastructure financing systems in place across the EU and in respect of the
subsidiarity principle, this White Paper does not lay down principles for financing
infrastructure.
6. The charging system would enhance the efficient use of infrastructure and therefore
also facilitate the efficient provision of new infrastructure, where needed. However, to ensure
this the charging framework would have to be flanked by efficient infrastructure investment
decisions based on comprehensive social cost-/benefit analysis (including those related to, for
example, improved land use planning and accessibility). Only projects having net social
benefits should be undertaken. In an integrating internal market, cross-state effects of new
infrastructure projects are likely to increasingly occur. These need to be fully taken into
account in the cost-benefit analysis and be reflected by investment and financing decisions.
The existence of cross-state benefits is an important justification for the co-financing from the
Community budget of Trans-European Transport Infrastructures. However, there are currently
no sufficient mechanisms in place to monitor and ensure that negative cross-state effects of
infrastructure investments are taken into account. This is particularly relevant in the case of
ports where new, publicly funded, infrastructures could be built, partly at the expense of ports
in other Member States that do not benefit from similar support. In addition to developing
transparent accounting, it is, therefore, proposed that information be exchanged on the costs
and benefits of public investments in this sector to ascertain that Member States fully take theeffects of investment decisions on other Member States into account. The Commission will
take an appropriate initiative under Article 129C2 of the Treaty.
7. The various studies which the Commission has carried out indicate that the proposed
user pays approach would significantly enhance the technical efficiency of the individual
modes of transport and greatly reduce environmental costs. Whilst some charges paid by users
would rise, the overall costs of the transport system would fall significantly. An extrapolation
on the basis of available studies suggests that the introduction of the user pays charging
system could lead to savings of the order of at least 30-80 billion ECU per year. A first
assessment also indicates that the proposed policy would be beneficial to both relatively
developed and economically less developed regions of the Community. However, the
Commission recognises that a more gradual introduction of the charging principles in
cohesion regions may be needed.
8. For reasons of transport efficiency and sustainability it is imperative that we replace
the current patchwork of charging mechanisms across Member States and modes by a
harmonised Community approach to transport charging. This White Paper sets out how this
can be done.1I NTRODUCTION
1. European transport infrastructure is of great importance for economic growth, labour
mobility, consumers, and the competitiveness of the European Community. It is therefore vital
that its provision and use is as efficient as possible. Achieving this objective is among other
questions dependent on how users are charged for infrastructure and what means are available
to finance investment. Moreover, achieving this objective is becoming increasingly difficult.
2. Relying on the purely public financing of transport infrastructure is becoming more
difficult, as Member States face growing financial burdens and seek to develop greater
involvement of the private sector in the financing of infrastructure projects. In other cases they
are considering how to recoup part of the costs from users when developing new public
infrastructure. At the same time, current trends in traffic patterns and growth are also under
examination, as escalating congestion and pollution raise doubts about the sustainability of
transport. Transport charges have a very clear role to play in addressing all these issues, as
changes to charges alter prices, which in turn can change transport use. Moreover, transport
users and providers are becoming more and more aware that differences in charges, in
different modes and different Member States, affect industry’s costs and competitiveness, and
distort the functioning of the single market.
3. All three problems can be seen as weaknesses in the European Community’s transport
market: infrastructure managers are not always able to recoup some of the private or public
benefits of providing infrastructure to recover a large part of their capital costs , so they are
reluctant to invest; the market fails to reflect external costs in its prices, so the use of some
modes is at times excessive; and tax and charge differentials distort the price signals of the
market and so distort industry’s transport choices. All three problems can be addressed using
economic tools: a Community framework for infrastructure charges can correct these market
failures.
4. This White Paper explains how infrastructure charging reform can solve many of the
transport sector’s problems, and help develop European transport services. It has evolved out
of the discussions on the 1993 Commission White Paper on “The future development of the
common transport policy”1, the 1995 Commission Green Paper “Towards fair and efficient
pricing in transport”2, the 1996 report of the high level group on public private partnership3,
and most recently, the report of the high level group on infrastructure charging, set up in
spring 1998 to advise on the development of a comprehensive set of charging principles4.
Finally, the joint Transport/Environment Council in June 1998 also called for measures to
make the best use of the existing infrastructure, to achieve a shift to less environmentally
damaging modes of transport, and the use of economic instruments to reduce fuel
consumption, emissions, and noise.
1 European Commission, COM(92) 494 final.
2 European Commission, COM(95) 691. The Green Paper recommended marginal cost pricing, a higher
degree of cost recovery and transparency as important principles for an efficient transport system, and
launched a wide debate on transport pricing.
3 High level group on Public-Private Partnership, 1997. The high level group report underlined the need for a
revenue stream from users to facilitate the setting up of public private partnership.
4 High level group on transport infrastructure charging, 1998.2
The paper is structured thus:
(a) the current problems of infrastructure charging and the need for introducing more
convergent charging principles are summarised;
(b) Community wide charging principles are presented and their implications in relation to
the problems are illustrated;
(c) a plan for the implementation of such principles in all modes is outlined;
(d) the implications of the proposed charging regime are examined.
2T RANSPORT PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM EXISTING CHARGING SYSTEMS
1. In order to better understand infrastructure charging systems, it is important to
consider the underlying cost structure, summarised in the following table. The two main
categories listed here are “fixed costs”, which are independent of the flow of traffic, and
“variable costs”, which do vary with traffic levels.
Cost components related to the provision and use of infrastructure
Fixed Costs Variable Costs
Internal Costs External costs/benefits Internal Costs Other external costs
Capital Costs:
· Repayment of capital
· Payment of interest
· Return on assets
Fixed Running Costs:
· Maintenance costs
(weather and time-
related)
· Operating costs
(lighting, traffic
management,
information)
· Administration
Costs:
Barrier effects
Deterioration of
landscape
Visual intrusion
Benefits:
Improved accessibility
Network benefits
Increased productivity
Variable running costs:
· Operating costs
(traffic
management,
enforcement,
supporting services)
· use-related
maintenance costs
(resurfacing, rail
replacement,
repairs)
Air and water pollution:
· local pollutants (e.g.
particulates)
· regional pollutants (e.g.
NOx)
· global pollutants (e.g.
CO2)
Accidents (partly)
Noise and vibration
Congestion (partly)
Source: based on the high level group on transport infrastructure charging, June 1998.
2. In an efficient5 and competitive transport sector, these different costs are taken into
account in decision making on the provision and use of infrastructure. For the provision of
infrastructure to be efficient it should be based on a full social cost-benefit analysis, taking all
private and broader public benefits and costs into account. Effects in fellow Member States
should also be included in the analysis. Given a particular level of infrastructure provision,
efficient transport use is promoted when the variable costs are reflected in the final prices
faced by transport operators and users. However where charges for infrastructure cease to be
cost related transport use is no longer efficient and the competitiveness of the European
transport sector is reduced. Where charges are too low, excessive demand is likely, generating
5 The term “efficient” or “efficiency” is used throughout this paper. It means a situation where the total costs are
minimised for a given level of benefits. This implies that all the consequences of transport decisions are
considered (external/internal, user/non-user) and no improvement in the allocation of resources or in transport
choices is possible.3
higher costs than benefits, and individual operators have less incentive to reduce the costs that
they impose on society. Where charges are too high, some users who would be able to pay the
costs they impose would be discouraged from using the infrastructure, thereby reducing its
social benefit.
3. In Member States, charges or taxes have long been levied on the transport sector
without bearing much relation to costs at all. They have been used as a part of a broader fiscal
policy to raise government revenues, but also to alter prices to reflect industrial, social, and
environmental policy considerations. Such charges and taxes often do not reflect costs and
vary between mode and Member State. This gives rise to a number of problems:
(a) distortions of competition between Member States (e.g. competing ports );
(b) distortions of competition between modes and within modes (most notably road and
rail freight);
(c) the failure to consider social and environmental aspects of transport(so the relative
environmental impact of different ways of making the same journey is not reflected in
prices);
(d) and difficulties in funding infrastructure investments (with transport users often
paying considerable amounts in tax, disconnected from the financing of the network).
4. These distortions are often thought of as specific problems isolated one from another,
such as modal imbalance (excessive use of roads and under utilisation of railways, inland
waterways or short sea shipping for instance), congestion (either in urban or inter urban areas)
and pollution. The following examples illustrate the seriousness of the problems and also how
they are in fact interrelated.
5. Different charging structures between Member States favour some operators at the
expense of others. This is clearly illustrated in the roads sector: Only one Member State levies
registration taxes on heavy goods vehicles. Five Member States levy road tolls, six others use
the Eurovignette scheme for heavy commercial vehicles, one other applies a different form of
user charge and three others do not charge for road use at all. All Member States levy annual
vehicle taxes, but these vary by up to 3000 ECU, and diesel fuel excise duties vary by as much
as 330 ECU per 1000 litres. The result of such variations is that road hauliers from different
Member States can face vastly different costs and unfair competition. Instead of organising
haulage along the most efficient routes and locations, hauliers may locate their business where
ownership taxes are lowest, refuel where fuel taxes are lowest and, where they have a choice,
choose routes where road tolls are lowest. Choices made by road hauliers are distorted by the
absence of a harmonised charging regime and the efficiency of the road haulage sector is
undermined.
6. Current charging practices can also allow some infrastructure operators to take
advantage of a monopolistic situation. In the aviation sector, strategically located airports can
exploit their quasi monopolistic position and charge airlines prices that do not reflect the costs
of services provided. This could lead to unnecessarily high air transport costs and adversely
affect the competitive position of Community airlines in the world market.
7. Moreover, when different modes are charged according to different principles the
modal balance is distorted. For instance, railway infrastructure charging practices across the4
Community include two part tariffs, multi-part tariffs, social marginal cost based charging,
negotiation based on willingness to pay and zero charges. The level of cost recovery varies
from zero in some Member States to 100%, in principle, in other Member States, and there is
no uniformity about what services are provided for the charge being levied or what parameters
are to be taken into account in setting charges. Complex, opaque charges confuse the
operation of the market. The complexity makes it hard for users merely to understand the
structure and level of the charge, and can frustrate competition. It discourages the
development of international services, particularly for freight traffic which crosses a number
of rail networks. The different charges also inhibit the user from responding to charging
signals: whereas one set of charges may encourage short trains on minor routes travelling at
night, another may encourage the opposite. As rail freight is often in competition with road
haulage, inland waterway and short sea shipping, its more complex charges raise
administrative costs, make it slower to bid for business and so less competitive. The other
obvious inter modal concern is that railways do not fully benefit from their relatively low
external costs since this is not reflected by the relative infrastructure charges levied on users.
8. A further example of distorted inter modal competition as a result of differing charging
systems, is the English Channel crossing. Here, for both passenger and freight traffic, there is
the choice of using road, rail, sea or air transport. The flurry of competition that began after
the opening of the Channel Tunnel was clearly and strongly influenced by the charging
regimes of the different modes: port charges, rail and tunnel access charges, unpriced
connecting roads, airport charges, even duty free regulations, all constrained in different ways
the means by which the different modes and routes could compete. And as the transport
market is liberalised, infrastructure improved and integrated through the Trans-European
Transport Network examples of such intensifying competition, between all modes, would
increase as would the need to reduce distortions arising from divergent charging structures.
9. Another important example of distortion to competition is the effect of charges in the
maritime ports sector. Current port charging arrangements are quite diverse and government
subsidies can allow ports to reduce prices and attract business from other ports. Inter port
competition clearly exists, and is also affected by hinterland and maritime access to the port,
so the charging structures of shipping, road and rail freight have a clear impact on the ports
sector. Conversely, more concentrated use of more heavily subsidised ports may lead to much
higher use of road or rail infrastructure in certain areas, and increased congestion.
10. In summary, different current charging principles distort competition, while common
charging principles would create a level playing field and correct intra and intermodal
imbalances.
11. Furthermore, current charging schemes seldom promote clean technologies. The
shipping sector for instance, produces a considerable proportion of emissions of sulphur
dioxide and nitrogen oxide, and emissions could be significantly reduced by greater use of low
sulphur bunker fuel and of catalytic converters. If the polluter pays principle is not applied,
however, and emissions not charged for, shippers face no encouragement to take such
measures. An emissions charging scheme would give operators the incentive to consider
reducing environmental pollution, as the reduction in emissions is rewarded by lower charges.
When the charges are higher than the costs of reducing emissions, shippers would reduce
emissions, and in socio-economic terms, the efficiency of the sector would be improved. The
same result would apply to other modes of transport.
12. Finally, the transport sector faces problems in securing financing for new
infrastructure investments. The growing difficulty of securing public-sector financial support5
for investment in transport infrastructure has brought about an increasing interest in charging
and in public-private partnerships (PPP) for financing infrastructure projects, particularly
those at a national and Community level, such as those belonging to the Trans-European
Transport Network. As has been clearly recognised by the high level group on PPP financing
of TEN transport projects, private sector participation will be determined by the prospect of an
acceptable level of profitability and a suitable revenue stream, subject to an acceptable level of
uncertainty. But, at present, less than 10% of road infrastructure costs and less than 30% of
rail infrastructure costs are recovered through direct user charges that accrue to infrastructure
managers. Direct charging of the traffic would therefore help provide a revenue stream for the
development of PPPs, which could reduce the need for public subsidy.
13. A number of existing Community policies and rules already address some of these
problems. For example, there exist a Directive that to some extent harmonises heavy goods
vehicle taxes and charges (for example Directive 93/89/EEC harmonises, to some extent,
heavy goods vehicle taxes and charges) and a Council Regulation (2978/94) on port charges
for segregated ballast oil tankers has clear environmental and safety objectives. Moreover, the
Commission has actively pursued infringement proceedings relating to divergences from
Community charging regimes and closely monitors State Aids in transport. However, the
existing frameworks do not address distortions arising from: certain transport charges and
taxes being related to the place of registration of means of transport (e.g. annual vehicle
taxes), the absence of a framework for taking external costs into account in a harmonised
manner across all modes of transport and the significantly different levels of infrastructure
cost coverage across modes of transport. These insufficiencies are widely recognised by
transport operators and several Community Institutions who have repeatedly called on the
Commission to come forward with proposals to address these problems.
14. Moreover, these problems are likely to worsen as transport markets are progressively
liberalised. Given the full liberalisation of the road haulage and the air transport markets in
1998 and the advent of complete market opening in sectors such as inland waterways (in the
year 2000) and the efforts to further open up the rail market, it is imperative to urgently
address the question of harmonising charging frameworks. Taken together, the lack of
correspondence between costs at point of use and charges levied, differences in charging
schemes between modes and Member States, distortive governmental interventions and the
existence of monopolistic charging make the European transport system much less efficient
than it need be. This leads to rising transport and environmental costs in general, which
reduces mobility, economic activity, economic growth, and harms peripheral areas of the EU
in particular. The potential for improvement, and the cross-frontier dimension of charging
policy, creates a clear need for a Community approach to transport infrastructure charging.
3A C OMMUNITY APPROACH TO INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGING
1. A Community approach to infrastructure charging should address the major
shortcomings of the existing systems analysed in Chapter 2. The basic purpose of the
proposed Community approach on infrastructure charging would, therefore, be to improve the
overall efficiency of the provision and use of European transport infrastructure, promote fair
competition, safeguard the single market and enhance the sustainability of the transport
system
2. At the same time, the development of a Community approach to infrastructure
charging should take full account of the subsidiarity principle. More particularly, this means
that the system should provide a framework based on common principles for all commercial6
modes of transport within which Member States to a great extent would be free to set charge
levels. The approach should also safeguard transparent and non-discriminatory schemes
which should apply equally to private and public entities. However current concessions should
not be affected by the new rules.
3. The principles underpinning the charging approach proposed for commercial vehicles
could usefully be extended to passenger cars and this would render the overall charging
system more efficient. However, the Commission considers that, for reasons of subsidiarity,
this decision is best left to the Member States. But the development and implementation of the
common charging system as it affects commercial passenger transport would obviously have
to dovetail with decisions taken on passenger cars in order to avoid undermining the position
of public transport and other commercial passenger services6.
4. It is clear that there is a need for the development of such a framework for commercial
transport at Community level. This is because infrastructure charges affect the conditions of
competition in the internal market; they can have a bearing on market access and they have a
significant influence on the development of international transport. In order to achieve these
objectives outlined, the approach should be based on the following basic concepts:
(a) The same fundamental principles should be applied to all commercial modes of transport
in each Member State of the European Union, while recognising that the resulting structures
may differ by mode and the level of charge may differ by location to reflect different needs
and circumstances.
(b) Infrastructure charges should encourage greater efficiency in the use of transport
infrastructure and, therefore, be based on the “user pays” principle: all users of transport
facilities should be charged for costs they impose at, or as close as possible to the point of use.
(c) Charges should be directly related to the costs that users impose on the infrastructure and
on others, including the environmental and other external impacts caused by the users.
Charges should only differ when there are real differences in costs and service quality and
should not discriminate between users on the basis of nationality and residence/business
location.
(d) Charges should promote the efficient provision of infrastructure.
The only charging approach that fully satisfies these criteria is marginal social cost charging:
charging users for the costs, both internal and external, they impose at the point of use (see
box).7 This would give users incentives to adjust transport behaviour in order to reduce total
costs to society whilst maximising private benefits, thereby maximising economic and social
welfare.
6 In addition, it is worth noting that the Commission has already tabled a proposal to improve the functioning
of the internal market by addressing cross-frontier problems with registration and taxation of passenger cars
arising from private individuals shifting residence from one Member State to another. Moreover, the
Commission also intends to come forward with a Communication in 1999 on a Community framework for
the taxation of vehicles.
7 When the term marginal cost is used it refers to social marginal costs including environmental externalities
etc.7
In combination with the subsidies paid by Member States directly to Infrastructure managers
to compensate for wider social benefits to non-transport users, marginal infrastructure cost
charging (including congestion costs, but excluding other “external” cost components) is
likely to lead to a high, possibly complete, recovery of infrastructure capital costs at the level
of the transport system as a whole. Should full recovery not be reached and should Member
States wish to arrive at a higher level of cost recovery, then the Commission considers that
this should be done through the imposition of additional non-discriminatory and non-
distorting fixed user charges.
In summary, the charging principles proposed in this paper, necessary for efficient use of
infrastructure networks, would also create the conditions for financing infrastructure from user
contributions that could accommodate different financing models. In view of the strongly
diverging infrastructure financing systems in place across the EU and in respect of the
subsidiarity principle, this White Paper does not lay down principles for financing
infrastructure.
A transport undertaking that faces the real costs would have clear incentives to adjust
transport choices, for instance:
– using vehicles that cause less road damage, are less polluting and are safer;
– changing routes and logistics to those with lower levels of road damage, congestion,
accident risks, and environmental impacts;
– or switching to a mode with less impacts.
5. Similarly, the charging system would also give incentives to promote transport safety
through a range of responses: transport users can purchase or switch to safer means of
transport and operate transport systems more safely, whilst infrastructure managers would
have incentives to improve the safety characteristics of their networks. Whilst this may
increase the direct costs, it would lead to even larger benefits through reductions in accident
related costs. Even transport operators that do not adjust their transport patterns would still
gain from changes made by others such as less congested traffic conditions, decreased
accident risks and so on. All in all, when charges are introduced that better reflect in a
balanced manner real costs at point of use in parallel with the abolition of certain existing
charge schemes or reductions certain other charges or taxes, most users would benefit.
6. It is also important to stress the fact that the marginal social cost charging principle
ties in with and balances other policy measures. Marginal social costs of transport are already
reduced by existing safety and environmental regulations. Emission standards on vehicles and
aeroplanes reduce external costs, weight restrictions for heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) and
railway wagons reduce infrastructure damage costs and safety standards reduce accident costs
for all modes. Since the standards reduce the costs, the charges would be lower than they
otherwise would have been. Thus, in general, a mode where effective standards are in place
will be compensated through lower charges. This type of infrastructure charging is also fully
consistent with the provision of services of general interest; notably public passenger transport
services. The charging principles only directly affect public transport operators, not final
consumers and governments fully retain the possibility of subsidising these transport services.
Where, in the absence of direct charging systems, governments currently pay for infrastructure
costs, sufficient financial means will be available upon the introduction of new charges to
offset any impact on public transport operators. Finally, where governments finance
infrastructure investments for other than pure transport reasons (e.g.; to unlock peripheral
regions) then marginal social cost charging is likely to lead to low charging levels since users8
would not have to pay for the capital costs associated with these investments (see also
paragraph 9).
7. Similarly, the development of a common charging system on the basis of the principles
proposed in this White Paper would also facilitate consistent land use planning at different
policy levels. By improving the efficiency of the transport system, transport links between
different locations would be enhanced and this would assist in making rational land use
planning decisions. The common transport infrastructure charging system also ties in with the
development of the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) which seeks to
enforce transport and cohesion goals by identifying the need for improved accessibility and a
more sustainable use of infrastructure at EU level.
A PRACTICAL DEFINITION OF MARGINAL SOCIAL COSTS
Marginal costs are those variable costs that reflect the cost of an additional vehicle or transport unit using
the infrastructure. Strictly speaking, they can vary every minute, with different transport users, at
different times, in different conditions and in different places. Moreover for the last extra carriage on the
train, car on the road, or ship at sea, marginal costs can often be close to zero. Clearly such a strict
definition is of no practical use, and like all other charging arrangements in the commercial world, a
degree of approximation and averaging is necessary to develop understandable, practical charging
structures. Marginal costs may at times merely reflect an average of variable costs. More usefully, they
should reflect infrastructure damage, congestion and pollution costs, and so would vary according to
factors like unit weight or number of axles, peak times, urban travel, and engine emissions.
Marginal cost components can include:
· Operating costs: energy, labour, some maintenance costs.
· Infrastructure damage costs: maintenance costs, wear and tear of the infrastructure, reflected by such as
resurfacing of roads, rails and runways.
· Congestion and scarcity costs: The cost of time delays to other users or non users, resulting from congested
traffic flows (on roads, queues for airports or railway stations). Moreover, a transport operator’s use of
infrastructure may prevent another operator from using it (e.g. an airport runway).
· Environmental costs: air, water, and noise pollution.
· Accident costs: Costs in terms of material damage, pain and suffering and production losses.
8. The Commission proposes that a framework should be drawn up that would introduce
this type of charging in all modes at Community level. Clearly, the system would have to be
developed gradually and progressively, and not all cost components could be included from
the outset. These issues are discussed in Chapter 4.
9. It can also be demonstrated that marginal social cost charging is an important pre-
requisite for efficient decisions on infrastructure provision. Only when investment decisions
are based on efficient, current and future, levels of infrastructure use will they themselves be
fully efficient. As the high level group on infrastructure charging confirmed, investment
decisions should be based on a full social cost-benefit analysis covering all costs and benefits
to society, public and private. Since some of the benefits of individual projects might accrue
to non-users of the network, for example, reduced pollution resulting from replacing a dual-
carriage way by a motorway or increased land values in cities connected to a High Speed Rail
line, it could be highly inefficient to require all the costs of every individual investment
project to be recovered from direct users. If that approach had been followed, very few High
Speed Rail lines would have been built in Europe. Imposing full cost recovery at the level of9
individual projects would therefore not only lead to major inefficiencies in transport use, it
could also lead to significant distortions in investment decisions.
MARGINAL SOCIAL COST CHARGING AND RECOVERY OF CAPITAL COSTS
Marginal social cost charges are not related to capital costs since the latter do not vary with transport use. This
raises the question whether a marginal social cost charging approach can recover infrastructure costs from
users.
It can easily be demonstrated that in the absence of benefits to non users this depends on the amount of
infrastructure capacity and the cost of expanding it: with efficient investment based on a cost-benefit approach,
charging for marginal infrastructure costs only (i.e. including congestion charges, but excluding other external
costs) will fully recover infrastructure costs if there are no economies of scale in infrastructure construction
(Newbery, 1988, Winston 1985 and Annex III). However, some infrastructure investments have other
technical characteristics. Available studies based on segments of the European transport network suggest that
for the transport system as a whole, such charges would ensure a high degree of cost recovery. The result
mainly derives from the fact that efficient levels of infrastructure provision are generally characterised by
some scarcity, implying that the congestion element in efficient charges is positive. As far as road
infrastructure is concerned, this depends critically on the inclusion of passenger cars.
However, in reality, not all provision of infrastructure is efficient. And there are benefits to non users which
suggest that some costs cannot be recovered from users. On the other hand, the proposed charging framework
would also incorporate external costs.
Available evidence (e.g. Roy 1998, ECMT 1998) suggests that a consistent application of the marginal social
cost charging principle advocated in this White Paper would in the current circumstances lead to a
significantly higher degree of infrastructure cost recovery from users in all inland transport modes in the EU
than is currently the case. Moreover, at the level of the transport system as a whole, revenues from efficient
charges are likely to be close to levels required for full infrastructure cost recovery from users. Thus, whilst
the proposed approach would not guarantee cost recovery for every individual infrastructure project, it would
generate sufficient revenues to fund the transport system’s infrastructure capital costs and pay for further
investments.
10. Having said that marginal social cost charges for transport infrastructure are likely to
produce revenue sufficient to pay for total infrastructure costs at the level of the transport
system as a whole, of course, it is for the Member States to decide how to use the revenues.
Obvious alternatives are to allocate funds to the infrastructure operators, to the general budget
– for example to restructure existing taxes - , or to earmark some revenues for infrastructure
funds, possibly multimodal, on national, regional or city levels. In addition, where new
transport charging systems are introduced existing transport charges will have to be amended
and/or phased out.
11. Charges will be collected by infrastructure managers, be they public or private. This
raises the question of the allocation of these revenues to different bodies (e.g. infrastructure
manager, the State) and the use to which they are put. Naturally, the infrastructure manager
would keep that part of the charges that are related to infrastructure costs (covering both
infrastructure damage and scarcity/congestion8). Charges related to other cost components
would more logically accrue to the State. The high level group on transport infrastructure
charging recommended that revenues related to external costs should be used to reduce the
external damage caused, by reducing or preventing the externality, or, where this is not
8 Obviously, high congestion charges indicate capacity scarcity and the desirability of expansion through
investments. Decisions on this should be made on the basis of a Social Cost Benefit Analysis (see paragraph
9).10
possible, to compensate those affected in some way (whilst respecting rules on State Aid).
Whilst such an allocation may be desirable, the Commission considers that, in keeping with
the subsidiarity principle, such decisions are best left to the Member States.
12. Whilst the analysis presented in the box on marginal social cost charging and in Annex
III indicates that marginal social cost charging would lead to much higher revenues from
direct user charges than is currently the case, the situation is likely to vary across different
(parts of) infrastructure networks. Where marginal infrastructure costs are above average costs
(for instance where capital costs are a low proportion of total costs and where capacity
constraints are being reached), then charging at marginal costs will both result in the most
efficient use of the infrastructure and lead to an over-recovery of costs through the
infrastructure part of transport charges based on marginal social costs. This will provide a
signal that there is a shortage of capacity and provide a surplus of funds to deal with the
problem. Where marginal costs are below average costs, then the reverse is true: revenues will
be insufficient to cover costs. In cases where such infrastructures are part of networks that are
also partly characterised by capacity shortages, the infrastructure managers are likely to be
able to “average out” deficits and surpluses across their networks. Where this is not possible
and there are wider benefits then there would be a strong case for government subsidy,
regardless of whether the infrastructure is publicly or privately owned. It has to be pointed out,
however, that, at present in the Union, there are hardly any infrastructure projects that are fully
privately financed without any financial support from the State. The proposed approach will,
therefore, significantly reduce the need for relying on direct government subsidies for
covering infrastructure costs.
13. Whilst the development of marginal cost charging systems for all transport
infrastructure, including all modes, terminals and related information and communication
systems offers significant advantages, there are, at least in the short to medium run, cases
where there should be scope for a higher degree of cost recovery from users at the level of
individual infrastructure projects. A higher degree of cost recovery may be required to ensure
that desirable investments, public, mixed and private, can be made and clearly the framework
must cater for such projects.
New projects
14. Funding the provision of new infrastructure is a key concern in European transport
policy and may need to influence the charging scheme for new infrastructure. This is
particularly true for expensive facilities like bridges and tunnels. Public sector provision has
traditionally been the most common approach. However as government budgets are under
increasing spending pressures, this is no longer the automatic route, for reliance on
exclusively public financing can unduly constrain the level of provision of infrastructure and
so increase inefficiency.
15. For this reason, and to benefit from other efficiencies in the private sector, public-
private partnerships are increasingly used to provide new infrastructure.9 However private
businesses need to secure revenues to recover all their costs, and depending on the degree of
public subsidy available, this can imply charges which may be higher than marginal costs,
especially at the beginning of a project when use is relatively low and scarcity related charges
are likely to be negligible. Whilst charges above marginal costs are likely to reduce the socio-
9 High-level group on Public-Private Partnership, 1997.11
economic benefits of a project, this may be necessary if public finance constraints mean that
the alternative is not to build the project at all.
16. Given that the differentiation inherent in marginal cost charging should lead to the
most efficient result, these supplementary charges should have as limited an impact as
possible on transport use, either in terms of total transport volume, or inter- or intra- modal
competition. To achieve this, the charges should ideally be of a flat rate nature in the sense
that they do not vary with the use of the infrastructure, but for practical reasons they may well
have to vary between classes of vehicle types or transport units. In practice, the appropriate
design would differ between projects. For example a vignette scheme may be a practicable
design for flat rate charges, whereby users pay a fixed “entrance fee” to use a defined
infrastructure for a fixed time (two part tariffs). Alternatively market segmentation could be
applied with higher charges for market segments with a low price sensitivity (so-called
Ramsey pricing).
17. After a period of years, long enough for supplementary charges to recover investment
costs and an appropriate return on capital, they should be discontinued.
18. Moreover, Member States need flexibility to define “new infrastructure projects” to fit
local conditions. For example, it typically would be appropriate to define a whole motorway
link as a new project when a lane is added and consequently charge equal fees on all lanes.
The possibility of including some existing connecting or parallel links as a part of a new
project for charging purposes should not be excluded either. However, it is clearly
inappropriate and inefficient to extend the project definition too broadly.
19. Equally, one of the uncertainties facing potential PPP investors is over future charging
regimes (for their own mode, but also for potentially competing modes), since this determines
traffic flows, revenue and therefore profitability: by providing a clear framework for charging
one barrier to the development of PPPs will be removed.
Competing infrastructure
20. The case where infrastructure projects or sectors are in direct competition at the
European level applies predominantly to terminals and interchanges such as major ports,
combined transport terminals, and even airports within the same catchment area. As long as
Member States are entirely free to decide on infrastructure investment and not take the effects
of their decisions on other Member States into account, the introduction of a marginal cost
charging approach at Community level might well not suffice to avoid significant distortions
in infrastructure provision. This is because some Member States, perhaps to secure purported
local benefits, would invest more than is desirable from the point of view of the transport
system as a whole. Such investments could lead to competing excessive investments in
neighbouring Member States in order to keep up their market share. At a Community level,
the net result is an over provision of infrastructure leading to a waste of scarce resources.
21. For major, competing terminals therefore, the marginal cost charging principle also
needs to be complemented to permit higher cost recovery, reflecting the level of the
investment. Such an option would not, however, exclude the possibility of the creation of over
capacity. Additional policy instruments are therefore required and this is discussed in section
5(h).
Conclusion12
22. The co-ordination of transport charging and the development of efficient charging
levels is expected to provide significant net benefits for the whole of society. It should lead
directly to improved technological, operational, and organisational efficiency; produce a small
desirable change in modal balance, and a small reduction in the growth of demand for
mobility.10 Commission studies also suggest that introducing a policy of marginal social cost
charging at EU level would lead to overall welfare benefits of the order of at least 30-80
billion ECU per year (see section 6a).
23. The charging system outlined here would directly address most of the problems
discussed in Chapter 2. It would promote fair competition within modes by linking charges
exclusively to the costs imposed by transport operators, independent of their nationality or
business location. When externalities and other costs are properly charged for, the operators
who invest in cleaner or less damaging vehicles or ships are rewarded by reduced charges.
Such investments would then pay off rather than harm businesses’ capacity to compete. The
proposed charging principles would also lead to a fairer competition within and across modes
as a result of which transport choices would be influenced by fair competition rather than
distortions in charging systems. When the same basic principle are applied in all Member
States, operators equitable conditions of competition would result and artificial relocations of
transport businesses to States with favourable tax regimes would be avoided. When charging
schemes are harmonised and implemented in a transparent manner, the administrative costs
for transport operators would be reduced and the ease with which the costs of different
transport options can be compared would be greatly enhanced. The current disadvantages
resulting from complicated and non-transparent rail charges constitute would be removed.
24. Marginal cost charges would also raise considerable revenue. In many cases this would
need to be offset by reductions in transport-related charges. At the same time the new charging
system would lead to a more efficient use of the infrastructure and thereby, to some extent,
reduce the need for new investment.
25. For certain projects an exemption would allow charges above marginal cost when this
is needed to finance important and socio-economically beneficial infrastructure projects.
26. The link between charges and costs would prevent some terminals profiting from
local, monopolistic market conditions, while at the same time steps can be taken to prevent
unfair competition in infrastructure provision leading to wasteful over capacity. A further
detailed examination of the impact of these proposals is contained in chapter six.
10 ECMT 1998.13
4A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO IMPLEMENTATION
1. The proposed charging approach will have to be introduced gradually and
progressively. This is because it must take into account the different starting points of the
various modes of transport in respect of existing European transport legislation, the complex
issues involved in developing new charges, and other constraints, such as revenue raising
requirements. Sometimes current charges may serve as a reasonable proxy for particular
marginal costs, and so no immediate change may be necessary. For example, the current
Directive on charging of HGVs and the planned Directive on airport charges have already
established the base for developing charges. In other modes, however, no such foundations
have been laid. Moreover, decisions on the design and the coverage of new charging systems,
both in terms of infrastructure networks and categories of means of transport, will have to take
full account of the costs of operation and implementation (“transaction costs”).
2. The Commission proposes a three phase approach. In phase one, the charging
framework should be established. In phase two, the Commission and Member States would
begin to adapt charging regimes to implement the framework. In phase three, the transition
would be completed, and all modes of transport would be subject to marginal cost charging.
The key characteristics of each phase are summarised immediately below, greater detail of the
priority actions being set out in chapter five.
4(a) Phase One: 1998-2000
3. During the first preparatory phase, agreement should be sought on methodologies for
measuring marginal costs and to promote the idea of charging at point of use. In line with
current legislation, charges up to average costs would generally be accepted.
4. In order to pave the way for the implementation of marginal cost charging principles,
common methods to estimate marginal costs including external costs have to be developed,
for all modes of transport. The Commission, will, therefore, propose to set up a Committee of
Governments experts on charging for the use of infrastructure” and this Committee should be
given an effective advisory role. The terms of reference for the work will be to develop and
advise the Commission on Community guidance on methods to estimate the marginal costs of
transport; develop practices to promote transparency of accounts; promote the development of
“transport accounts” at Member State level; and to advise the Commission on statistical and
research needs and priorities. The Committee will be supported by the use of independent
experts and other stakeholders, involving transport operators, users, industry, consumers,
transport workers and other interested parties. Obviously, it will be for the Commission to
come forward with the necessary legal proposals, in the drawing up of which it will take full
account of the work of the Committee.
5. The 1998 proposal for railway infrastructure charging would need to be adopted as
soon as possible to ensure that a Community framework exists for the two main modes of
inland transport.11 The Commission’s proposal for a Council Directive on airport charges
should be implemented and a framework for port charges should also be developed. Finally, a
proposal for the revision of Regulation 1107/70 on State aids in inland transport will be made
later in 1998 and consideration given to the need for further refinement of State aid rules and
11 Road transport is covered already in Dir. 93/89/EEC.14
guidelines for other modes. As well as developing infrastructure cost based charges, the
Commission would encourage the development of charges based on external costs for all
modes provided that this does not lead to charges higher than average infrastructure costs.
Such charges are already under discussion in the Council in the context of its deliberations on
the modification of the existing Directive on heavy goods vehicle charges and should be
permitted under the new proposal on rail infrastructure charges.
6. The Commission believes this first phase should run until the end of 2000. This should
allow the second phase to begin in 2001 with broadly compatible, basic charging systems
being put in place for road, rail, ports and airports as well as the above State aids
provisions.
4(b) Phase Two: 2001-2004
7. Having established the charging framework and methodological approaches, the
second phase would involve adapting particular charges better to reflect the new approach and
to harmonise charging systems between modes. In this phase, it is proposed that charges
should in general be set at total social marginal costs, that is marginal infrastructure and
external costs. Charging levels for externalities having a Community dimension should be set
at Community level, probably at an agreed low rate to begin with. The revenues would
obviously accrue to Member States. Other charges by Member States for congestion and other
local externalities would be encouraged and should, when introduced, be based on an agreed
Community framework methodology, to be developed in the Committee. As well as
continuing to examine charging methodologies, the Committee should begin reviewing
charging practices with potentially significant cross border impacts.
8. Changing to charges reflecting the use made of the infrastructure should lead to a
higher degree of cost recovery directly from users. However, Member States would be free to
levy supplementary charges to reach an even higher degree of infrastructure cost recovery for
new infrastructure projects if they so wish. These additional charges should ideally be flat rate
(subscription type – two part tariffs). Revenues from charges imposed to cover external cost
charges can also be used to finance further investment. However charging levels in different
modes should, under no circumstances, exceed the sum of average infrastructure costs and
external costs.
9. The introduction of new transport charges would not only need to be part of a
restructuring of the existing tax and charges structure in the transport sector but would also
have to be consistent with the development of the general tax policy. Such an approach would
permit further reforms to be implemented in a budget neutral way as regards the economy as a
whole12.
4(c) Phase Three: beyond 2004
10. Whilst lessons would be drawn from experiences during the first and second stages, in
general, the third phase would be to further implement harmonised charging principles, both
in terms of the marginal cost basis and the consistency of cost estimation. The level of
Community wide charges for externalities should also be reviewed. Consideration could also
12 The Commission has already proposed the relevant provisions regarding fuel taxes in COM(97) 30 final.
This issue is discussed further in section 5 (g).15
be given to requiring mandatory charging structures, but not levels, for local externalities.
Such an approach would alleviate pressure on Member States to reduce local charges because
of international competition.
Overview of charging rules
First phase Second phase Third phase
Maximum Varies by mode, but generally,
average infrastructure costs
4
marginal infrastructure plus
local and Community wide
external costs
1,2,3
Minimum Varies by mode, between zero and
average infrastructure costs
4
marginal infrastructure plus
Community wide external
costs
1,2,3
External costs
Differentiation allowed
1
Marginal social
cost charging
1,2, 3
1 on the basis of agreed parameters/methodologies
2 supplementary charges for new projects allowed subject to a maximum of average infrastructure and external costs
3 balanced by reductions in existing taxes and charges.
4 This reflects the existing minimum and maximum levels in different modes of transport
5I MPLEMENTATION, PRIORITY ACTIONS AND MODAL IMPLICATIONS
1. This chapter focuses on priority actions during the first two phases of the implementation
process. Separate descriptions are provided for the different modes.
5(a) Development of consistent costing and accounting practices
2. To implement the charging principles outlined, a number of issues concerning cost
estimation must to be analysed. There is a need to develop practical cost estimation
methodologies, and there is much to be gained by co-ordinating the work on this matter of the
Commission and Member States. To address these questions and assist the Commission in its
work in connection with infrastructure charging the “Committee of Government experts on
charging for the use of transport” (“the Committee”) should begin to work effectively, and
would be chaired by the Commission.
3. The terms of reference for the Committee should be updated. It would be made clear
that the Committee covers all modes and five specific purposes would be identified.
(1) Develop Community guidelines on methods to estimate the marginal costs of transport.
The recent discussions in Council on the Alpine dimension of the Eurovignette regime have
demonstrated that there is an unacceptably wide variety of approaches to calculating and
charging for the costs of road infrastructure. There are a number of potential methods
available to estimate the different marginal costs of transport infrastructure use and a lot of
research has been completed in this field. The Committee need not necessarily seek to identify
one single method to measure a certain cost category, but define how different cost estimation
or valuation methods can be properly applied. Whilst the ideal outcome would be an
intermodal approach to methodology development, differences between modes may well
justify some mode specific variations. The estimation of infrastructure damage costs and
congestion costs should be given first priority, but the Committee should also consider the16
valuation of environmental impacts and accident risks. As to fixed costs, a Community-wide
approach to estimating capital costs, including depreciation methods, also needs to be
developed.
(2) Develop practices to promote transparency of accounts and develop “transport accounts”
at Member State level.
To facilitate the implementation and the enforcement of charging and State aid rules,
particularly for terminals, transparent accounting practices must be developed. On this point,
the Committee’s work should be to identify best practice on cost accounting. The forthcoming
inventory of current charging principles for sea ports should be a starting-point for the
assessment.
The Committee should also advise on methods for determining the level of cost recovery at
modal and transport sector level and promote the establishment of transport cost and revenue
accounts at the level of single Member States. The Committee should advise the Commission
on a possible revision of Regulation 1108/70 on introducing an accounting system for
expenditure on infrastructure in respect of all modes of transport.
(3) Review charging practices
When Member States begin to implement charges based on the principles explained in this
paper, the Committee has an important role to play in reviewing charging practices and
advising the Commission on issues related to compliance with the charging principles set out
in this paper. It should assess whether marginal cost charges are based on appropriate cost
estimates, given the national or local context; whether a proposed two part tariff (levied to
achieve cost recovery) is reasonably non-distortive; and whether charges are non-
discriminatory and sufficiently transparent.
(4) Advice on statistical and research needs and priorities.
The estimation of marginal costs and the development of transport accounts should be
supported by further research. The Committee would therefore ensure that full use is made of
existing Community funded research on transport charging and advise on issues related to
future research within the 5
th framework programme of the European Community for
research, technology development and demonstration activities. Special attention would be
paid to the CAPRI-project, a concerted action on transport pricing research including guidance
on best charging practices. In addition research would also concentrate on existing gaps in the
theory and on the appropriate allocation of responsibilities between different levels of
Governments (local, regional, Member State, Community).
In order to estimate marginal costs and develop transport accounts, improved transport
statistics are needed. Efforts to improve statistics should be co-ordinated with the
Commission’s current activities on the improvement of data sources on the costs and other
economic and social data of the transport sector. Together with Eurostat, the Commission has
already identified some areas where data improvement is necessary, including investment in
the transport sector.
4. The Committee of Government experts on the charging of transport infrastructure
should be flanked by a wider forum consisting of independent experts and representatives
from relevant organisations. Based on recommendations from the Committee and the wider
forum, the Commission should develop guidelines and legislative proposals when appropriate.17
ACTION:
· Make effective use of the Committee of governments experts on charging for the use of
transport infrastructure to assist the Commission in the development of methods to
estimate marginal costs of transport; promote the development of transport accounts at
Member State level; develop accounting practices to safeguard cost recovery for terminals;
advise on statistics and research needs and priorities and review charging practices.
· Launch research within the 5
th framework program concerning estimation of marginal
costs, measurement and valuation principles regarding transport accounts and charging
regimes in order to fully recover infrastructure costs.
· Develop a comprehensive approach to common transport statistics. Consider revision of
Regulation (EEC) No 1108/70 on an accounting system for expenditure on infrastructure
in respect of all modes of transport.
5(b) Road
5. The main long term objective is to improve the efficient use of the European road
network, promote sustainable road transport, and encourage appropriate investment in Trans
European Networks. To achieve this, the Commission intends to develop a comprehensive
road charging scheme for HGVs and commercial passenger transport that would aim to be
compatible with urban road pricing schemes.
6. In the first phase, the Committee should review cost methodologies to determine an
agreed basis for setting charges based on infrastructure and congestion costs. This would
include the development of common accounting and costing methodologies. Those measures
should be flanked by efforts to develop standards for charging technologies. Member States
would then be encouraged to harmonise or adopt interoperable systems for road pricing for
HGVs either through existing toll or Eurovignette systems or, preferably, through the
development of more cost related electronic kilometre charges. The Commission expects that
this would be considered by many Member States as an attractive alternative to systems
having no use-related charges at all or only time based user charges. It would also lead to a
much greater degree of distance related charging across the Community. The Commission will
also develop a proposal for the environmental classification of HGVs to facilitate the
development of charges that can better reflect the different costs of environmental impacts due
to vehicle use. Finally, Member States are encouraged to develop urban road pricing schemes
to deal with the external costs, including congestion costs, of urban transport. It is not
appropriate that such schemes be organised at Community level, though the Commission will
continue to fund research and demonstration projects related to urban road pricing. Any
Community legislation that may harm the implementation should be reviewed with the
ambition to remove such obstacles.
7. In the second phase, distance related charges should be extended to include external
costs in addition to infrastructure costs. Such charges would apply also to new road
concessions, allowing cost recovery charging where new investments are anticipated. Efforts
should also be made to further promote the implementation of urban road pricing schemes
which are interoperable with HGV charging.
8. In the third phase, the common scheme should become mandatory. Thus, harmonised
marginal cost based charges for HGVs and commercial passenger transport should replace
existing charging schemes on the basis of a variety of instruments including tolls and user
charges.18
Electronic charging13
9. It is now technologically possible and economically feasible to implement electronic
road charges that can reflect with reasonable accuracy the marginal costs of road use. The
main technologies are microwave technology where an on board unit communicates with road
side equipment and satellite positioning and navigation systems and GSM where the on board
unit communicates with a satellite and mobile telephony is used to collect payment. A number
of microwave based systems have been introduced on specific routes, and although CEN pre-
standards have been adopted further effort is needed to establish European standards for these
technologies. Compared to microwave based systems, GPS and GNSS have the advantage that
they demand no road side equipment and in the long run might prove less costly. Indeed
technology that makes it possible to implement highly differentiated charges is already being
deployed for other purposes such as fleet management and will soon be introduced in new
vehicles as the electronic tachograph (to monitor driving and rest times) becomes mandatory
under Community law..
10. The charging system for HGVs is a particular priority for the European Commission as
the sector is distinctly international and such traffic is very important for the development of
the single market. A developed Community scheme for charging of HGVs would be an
important step for implementing charging principles. The system should be developed so that
it would dovetail with schemes being developed by cities and regions for urban road pricing.
Indeed an electronic charging scheme for trucks is emerging as the natural successor to the
current Eurovignette system. To promote such a development the option of standard electronic
charging should be added to the relevant Community legislation. However, this would require
further analysis of technical aspects, harmonisation and administrative issues.
Other measures
11. In the meantime, the Commission would encourage Member States to develop and
implement electronic fee collection systems in a harmonised manner. The way forward will be
presented in a Communication on Interoperable Electronic Fee Collection in Europe. Based
on the findings of this Communication every consideration will be given to the technological
and administrative interoperability of the systems to ensure unconstrained mobility across the
Community. Building on this the Commission will also put forward a proposal on electronic
fee collection convergence.
13 These issues will be further developed in a Commission Communication on Interoperable Electronic Fee
Collection in Europe.19
Possible kilometre charge for heavy goods vehicles
HGVs impose a range of costs which they often do not currently directly pay for. These include road damage,
noise and air pollution, all of which vary with the size, weight, engine, and type of vehicle. Imposing a charge
based on these costs, at point of use, according to vehicle type, would therefore give a clear signal to hauliers,
and the costs would be paid for. Secondly, as road haulage is an international industry, it is important to charge
the vehicle at the point of use so that the principle of territoriality is respected.
A range of technical options, both electronic and non electronic, are available for Member States to charge for
road use. Digital, electronic tachographs which measure kilometres travelled will be required in new vehicles
within two years from now and on board global positioning systems (for example GPS) have been developed so
distance, time, location, vehicle class, and road type can all be detected and recorded electronically. Such
systems are already being used for fleet management purposes.
The cost of the more sophisticated electronic on board units is roughly 500 ECU per vehicle and the experience
of Sweden suggests that administration costs for a similar scheme are quite low, at about 2.6% of revenues. The
level of charge per kilometre could be based initially on the marginal infrastructure costs per km and marginal
inter urban congestion costs. A recent study for the Commission has roughly estimated the costs of HGVs for all
roads in different Member States. The marginal infrastructure cost estimates range from 0.02 ECU per km in
Spain to 0.08 ECU in Germany, and the congestion costs range from 0.02 ECU to 0.3 ECU depending on the
density of traffic and differ largely as a result of different values for time. The charges would clearly need to
differ with vehicle classes, road types and Member State, to reflect the different costs. However charging on a
consistent basis would remove distortions to the current European road haulage market.
For vehicles without the equipment making occasional journeys, a simple time based or route specific (paper)
permit system is possible. Such a permit could be bought in advance, and could contain information on location,
vehicle type and category, and the distance or route of travel permitted. The system should however only be used
for a limited number of vehicles mainly from countries not yet deploying an electronic system.
The impact of km charges has also been studied. The charge could lead to more efficient use of HGV capacity
and a positive net government budgetary effect allowing the revenues to be used to reduce other, less efficient
charges or taxes.
12. The European Commission also has a role to play in funding road pricing related
research, development and demonstration projects. Social issues, including “user acceptance”
should be given a high priority, and resources for this purpose will be reserved within the
Fifth framework research programme.
13. The Commission will continue to promote the exchange of best practice for road
charging across the Community, and also supports urban road charging demonstration
projects. In order to facilitate the implementation of such schemes the Commission plans to
co-operate with cross-national groups of urban or regional authorities that are seriously
considering implementing road pricing. It will offer a co-ordinated approach to ensure that
these groups can take full advantage of the Commission’s research and technical work in this
area, including the experience accumulated to date.
14. One important step in the development of charging schemes is the creation of
harmonised cost accounting methods for determining road infrastructure costs. As noted
above, this is an area the Commission feels early joint discussions could contribute to agreed
methodologies for potential application across the EU.
15. A further initiative that the Commission supports is analysis of the treatment of road
accident costs in charging for transport use. The costs of traffic accidents is a complicated area20
in theory, empirically, and ethically. To some extent the costs are met directly by the
individual or through the insurance system. However some costs are still “external”, and not
faced by transport users. Ensuring that prices better reflect accident costs would give
infrastructure managers and transport users incentives to improve safety which would drive
down accident costs. The Commission proposes that further work be carried out examining
the scope for better internalising the cost and risk of accidents through insurance schemes, and
the need for government action in this area. To consider this issue and develop best practice
guidance, the Commission proposes establishing a group of experts drawn from the insurance
industry, academia and consumer interest groups to advise on best practice on motor liability
insurance.
16. Regulation 1107/70 on State aid will be revised in line with the charging principles
outlined in this paper. The new State aid rules would contribute to the establishment of fair
competition.
ACTION:
· Communication on interoperable electronic fee collection systems in Europe.
· Proposal on electronic fee collection convergence and standards.
· Further develop a proposal on charging for HGVs and commercial passenger transport.
· Set up groups of urban and regional authorities seriously considering implementation of
road pricing.
· Set up an advisory group to develop a best practice on motor liability insurance schemes
and internalisation of road traffic accident risks.
· Revision of regulation 1107/70 on State aid in inland transport.
5(c) Rail
17. The need to promote efficient use of railway infrastructure, fears of distortions to
intermodal competition particularly from road transport and the need to fund new investment
are the main problems for the rail sector. Charging the use of railway infrastructure according
to marginal costs would send appropriate price signals to railway undertakings about the
actual cost of each journey. Future charging regimes should be based on marginal costs and if
necessary to extend charges for new infrastructure in a way that least distorts these price
signals.
18. To ensure that the two principal modes of land transport are on a similar footing, the
Commission is putting forward a proposal for a Directive on railway infrastructure charging,
basing charges on marginal infrastructure costs. This should be adopted in phase one. In the
proposal, cost recovery charges are permitted when the operation of the infrastructure would
not otherwise be viable. Such charges should be implemented in a non distorting manner, for
instance, by achieving a higher degree of cost recovery from less price sensitive passenger
services. Differentiation of charges to take account of external costs would also be permitted,
as rail transport has lower external costs than some other modes.
19. A more efficient solution would require charging for the marginal external costs.
Therefore as part of phase two and the development of charges for externalities, the
Commission will investigate implementing noise related environmental charges for the
railways in parallel with charges for other external costs in other modes.21
20. Demand for particular routes, lines, sections of lines, and stations, varies with the time
of day, the nature of the traffic, and the scope for alternative routes. In principle therefore,
railway undertakings should pay differing amounts for different routes and times to reflect the
scarcity of capacity and to ensure that allocation is more efficient. Charges of this nature are
put forward in the Commission proposal.
21. In phase three, consideration would be given to rendering the allocation of rail
infrastructure capacity more efficiently. However further research is needed for this and a
project is being funded under the Fourth framework programme of the European Community
for research, technology development and demonstration activities.
ACTION:
· Proposal for a Council Directive on rail infrastructure charging and capacity allocation.
· Revision of regulation 1107/70 on State aid on inland transport.
5(d) Inland waterways
22. The Commission supports the development of more transparent and consistent
charging principles in all modes of transport. So in inland waterways as in other modes,
objectives include the development of common standards for charging, and common
accounting and costing methodologies for determining the cost of infrastructure. The marginal
costs of inland navigation are very low, and transportation is only one of the several uses of
the inland waterways, others largely relating to water management and supply, so any
calculation of inland waterway charges should reflect this. Moreover both the financial and
the environmental costs of inland waterway traffic are amongst the lowest of all modes.
23. Given the low level of costs, and the absence of evidence that current charging policies
are producing any significant distortion of competition, the Commission is of the view that
reform of inland waterway navigation charges should be considered by the Committee, and
changes developed for proposal for the third phase.
ACTION:
· Revision of regulation 1107/70 in state aid.
5(e) Aviation
Air Traffic Services (ATS)
24. Current charges for the use of Air Traffic comprise mainly en route charges which are
levied according to aircraft weight and flight distance; when terminal area control charges are
levied they do not include the distance factor. They are used to recover total costs, not just
variable costs, and do not consider fully environmental or congestion costs. Principles
governing ATS charges are established by international organisations, such as ICAO and
Eurocontrol. Within the latter, a multilateral agreement has been signed by 27 European States
(including all EU Member States but Finland) to adopt a common policy in respect of the
calculation of the charges, of their cost base and of their collection. By that, revenues are
collected by Eurocontrol, using a so called “unit rate” calculated by dividing the total costs for
ATS by traffic volume.22
25. Given the comparatively high degree of harmonisation and differentiation of current
charges, and since as present charging mechanisms reflect the actual infrastructure costs, and
partly the congestion ones, this is not an area in need of immediate action by the Commission.
To develop more efficient charges based on the principles of user pays and polluter pays,
charging structures should expand to also reflect:
· engine/fuel type (to reflect emissions, and noise costs, which vary with engine size)
and
· time of travel (as peak times raise sector operating costs).
26. If charges can reflect these different costs in a significant way, so that airspace users
pay for the services they use and the costs they impose, and no more, then such users can
respond by changing routes, times, aircraft, fuel, engines, and so on.
27. The Committee would be invited to consider the possibility of greater cost relatedness
of charges, particularly to reflect the emission costs of air transport. When charges reflect
infrastructure, external and congestion costs, it is expected that air traffic services will achieve
full cost recovery, and so further enable their ongoing commercialisation.
28. The current Commission position on the taxation of aviation fuel is that such taxation
should be introduced as and when the international legal situation allows the Community to
levy such a tax on all carriers including those from third countries. This policy was adopted
following a review and subsequent report on the existing obligatory exemption. In order to
provide more information on the effects of this policy and in response to a request from the
Council, the Commission has launched a comprehensive study on the effects of such taxation.
The results will be available in autumn 1998. This study will be used as the basis for further
discussion in the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament in the context
of the Commission Proposal for the taxation of energy products.
ACTION:
· Communication on air transport and environment.
· Follow up to the study on taxation of aviation fuel.
· Analyse possibilities to link ATC charges to pollution levels rather than
develop a separate scheme for the purpose.
· Green paper on financing of air traffic management infrastructure.
Airports
29. To improve the use made of airports, and reduce the possibility for excessive charging,
the Commission’s proposal for a Council Directive on airport charges proposes applying the
principle of “cost-relatedness”. This implies that airport charges should be based on the costs
of facilities and services provided by the airport, allowing for a reasonable return on capital,
the proper depreciation of assets, as well as the efficient management of capacity. The
proposed Directive also proposes developing the transparency of airport accounts, establishing
mandatory consultation procedures. In addition, the proposal, if adopted, would include the
options of implementing congestion (peak/off-peak) charging, possibilities for modulating
airport charges in terms of the environment (e.g. noise) as well as provisions for monitoring
airport efficiency.23
30. Complementing this approach, consideration will have to be to given to improving the
slot allocation process. The Commission therefore intends to revise the current Regulation on
slot allocation. In the longer term a further alignment with the general charging principles set
out in this White Paper would be desirable.
ACTION:
· Adoption of Council Directive on airport charges.
· Communication on air transport and environment.
· Communication on air transport market.
· Communication on airport capacity and airport cost developments in the EU (inc. policy
options to relieve congestion).
5(f) Maritime
Maritime shipping
31. Maritime shipping has comparatively low infrastructure and external costs, although
emissions of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides are significant and give rise to concern.
Preparatory actions in the first phase should therefore include consideration of emissions from
shipping in the context of ongoing international discussions on the matter. At present
Community legislation provides for a mandatory tax exemption for fuel used in ships. In the
second phase, consideration would be given to the introduction of minimum standards for fuel
quality and the Commission should consider the possibilities for levying environmental fuel
charges that vary in respect of emissions. Alternatively, fairway charges could be introduced
that would be differentiated on the same basis. Again, however, all such changes would have
to be compatible with international agreements in this area. Discussions on adjusting
standards and charges will therefore also take place in international forums such as MARPOL.
Ports and maritime infrastructure
32. As set out in the Commission’s Green paper on Ports and Maritime Infrastructure, the
Community’s ports policy should aim at creating equitable conditions of competition across
ports in the EU whilst maximising the efficiency of the use of the ports sector as a whole. A
Community framework for port charging can make an important contribution to the
achievement of this objective. In line with the general principles set out in this White Paper,
the Commission, therefore, considers that port users should pay for the costs they impose.
However, it is recognised that marginal cost charging would not always suffice to fully
recover infrastructure costs from users. Higher charges should, therefore, be allowed, provided
they are non-distortive. The Community framework in this field would, therefore, require
cost-related charging with marginal costs as the minimum.
33. The debate on the green paper has shown that there is a broad consensus on the need
for improved transparency of port financing. Accordingly, as a first step, an inventory of the
systems under which the community’s main ports are financed needs to be established
showing how public and private sources of finance are used. The Commission should take the
necessary steps for the establishment of such an inventory as a priority matter, including any
modification of accounting and reporting requirements that may be needed. Considerable
interest has also been shown in the possibility of further clarification of the extent to which
the Treaty rules on State aid impact on investment decisions in the ports sector. This
possibility should also be pursued in parallel to the establishment of the inventory. Both24
exercises would be pursued in close contact with the organisations representative of the ports
sector whose close co-operation can make a decisive contribution to this early realisation.
34. For reasons explained further below, State aid rules would not provide a complete
solution to the problems of the sector since by their nature they apply only to payments that
favour particular enterprises, not to the provision of public infrastructure to which all have
equal access. Accordingly, it would also be necessary to continue work on a framework for
port charges as part of the more general approach to co-ordination of investment in
infrastructure described in section 5(h). The provision of maritime infrastructure outside the
port would also be addressed in that context.
ACTION:
· Inventory of port finances and transparency of accounting practices.
· Evaluation of need for further clarification of State aid guidelines in ports sector.
· Development of a framework for port charging.
5(g) Transport related tax policy
35. Clearly, the introduction of the infrastructure charging framework would have to
dovetail with the development of existing frameworks at Community level for VAT and fuel
excise duties.
36. VAT is governed by a Community wide regime under the Sixth VAT Directive
(77/388/EEC). It is constructed as a general consumption tax for revenue raising purposes and
it is therefore not an appropriate or particularly effective instrument for pursuing non-fiscal
goals such as environment protection or transport policy. However, there are significant
differences in the way that passenger transport is taxed by different Member States and also
some significant differences in the way that different modes of transport are taxed within
Member States. In some cases, the differences in VAT treatment create distortions between
competing modes of transport.
37. Recognising this problem, the Commission launched a study on the VAT regime and
its effects on competition in the field of passenger transport. Later this year the Commission
will issue a formal consultation paper that will present options for change. The options will
need to ensure that EU based transport operators are not disadvantaged in comparison with
non-EU based operators and also that, as far as possible, different modes of transport are not
disadvantaged in comparison with their competitors. Proposals for change arising from the
consultation procedure will need to be prepared and considered in the light of the
development of the future common VAT system. Moreover, VAT should not impede the
development of public transport services. Clearly, the development and phasing in of
Community rules and guidelines on taxation as applying to transport and the phasing in of the
proposed transport charging approach should fully respect this and lead to the creation of a
truly balanced pricing system for all modes of transport.
38. There exists Community legislation that lays down minimum rates of excise duty on
motor fuels. Member States are free to apply rates above these minima and most do. On 12
March 1997, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Council Directive restructuring the
Community framework for the taxation of energy products (COM (97)30).The broad thrust of
the new proposal is to extend the scope of the existing Community-wide system beyond
mineral oils to other competing fuels. Under the new proposal the Community minimum25
levels of taxation on, inter alia, motor fuels (agreed in 1992 and therefore in many cases
substantially below the rates applied by Member States) are updated. The proposed increases
in minimum rates are spread out over a period of four years. It is proposed that in the first step
the minimum tax level on unleaded petrol should be increased by 45%. A corresponding
increase of 27% is proposed for diesel. Today most Member States apply tax rates far above
EU minimum rates. Therefore, the effect on most national tax rates of the proposal would be
limited. The new framework would provide Member States with greater freedom to
differentiate duty rates above the minima. It would also allow Member States who introduce
new direct road pricing instruments, under specific conditions, to reduce the level of taxation
that they apply to motor fuels, even if this leads to levels of taxation that are lower than those
contained in the new Directive. Adoption of this Commission proposal would improve the
situation with regard to differences in tax rates on diesel fuel.
39. In the field of vehicle taxation the Commission has carried out a major review of
current situation in the European Union and intends to – based on the findings of this review -
address the problem in this field during 1999.
5(h) Efficient provision of infrastructure
40. To develop efficient levels of infrastructure investment, rigorous cost benefit analysis
is required, that considers all costs, including capital costs, in making investment decisions.
New infrastructure that is built should then be charged in accordance with the marginal cost
charging principle, unless higher charges are needed to recoup capital costs for the building of
the infrastructure to be possible. This provision should allow a greater degree of private
financing of infrastructure or even public funding which is required to earn a return.
41. A lack of co-ordination in the assessment of prospective investments can lead to major
distortions. For example, the non-inclusion of some benefits to non-national EU citizens may
lead to the underestimation of total benefits of viable projects and to the under provision of
TENs transport infrastructure. This is one of the justifications for the TENs budget line and
intervention at Community level. Conversely, when Member States do not include the costs of
new infrastructure projects to other Member States an over provision of infrastructure is likely
to occur. These costs can result from a substitution from existing facilities to the new project;
a development which is especially likely to occur when prices in the new facility are low. This
is particularly relevant to internationally competing transport terminals, notably ports and
combined transport terminals.
42. State aid rules can have application in the field of investment in infrastructure and so
eliminate distortions where the provision of public finance favours certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods. For example, where public finance is used to provide
infrastructure for a particular transport operator, giving it an unfair advantage over its
competitors, the State aid rules apply.14 Likewise recent years have seen increasing
involvement of private capital and/or management in infrastructure projects. In these cases the
view has been taken that there is a potential advantage to the undertaking concerned if
compensation provided by the State is greater than necessary to achieve the purpose
concerned. A non-discriminatory tender is one clear way to ensure the compensation is no
14 Aviation State aid guidelines, OJ No C 350, 10.12.94, p. 5, paragraph 12 (2).26
greater than necessary15. In the absence of such a tender this has to be ensured through extra-
careful scrutiny of the financial arrangements by the Commission.
43. On the other hand, where transport infrastructure is directly financed and managed by
public authorities and is open to all users, actual and potential, on equal terms and in
conformity with applicable Community legislation, no particular enterprise or production may
be readily shown to be favoured over others in a way which distorts competition and affects
trade between Member States within the meaning of Article 92(1) EC. For this reason,
investment in transport infrastructure has traditionally been viewed as a general measure of
economic policy normally not falling within the State aid rules.
44. However, State aid rules have an increasing role to play as the Member States turn
more to private undertakings for the purpose of developing and managing transport
infrastructure. It is, therefore, necessary to define comprehensively where public finance for
infrastructure favours particular enterprises in a way which distorts competition and affects
trade between Member States. The Commission intends to clarify and update its approach to
State Aid for infrastructure in inland transport by revising Regulation 1107/70, implementing
Article 77 of the Treaty. It will also evaluate the need for further clarification of State Aid
guidelines, particularly as regards ports and other terminals. But other means are needed to
ensure that public investments, particularly large ones, do not lead to inefficient over capacity
and unfair competition with others. The Commission considers that in the first instance a
voluntary investment co-ordination initiative at Community level, possibly based on Article
129c, par. 2,16 could make a major contribution to meeting this objective. The need for
further measures of a binding nature in the area of investment co-ordination would be assessed
in the light of the results of these developments.
45. The voluntary investment co-ordination initiative will need to build on two elements:
some convergence of methodologies for social cost benefit analysis, so that co-ordination has
a reliable foundation, together with procedures for co-ordination. Since the nature of the cost
benefit analysis for this purpose is very much in line with that required to identify the trans
European benefits of TENs projects, work on methodologies will need to be taken forward in
the context of preparations for the forthcoming review of the TENs Transport Guidelines,
which will be addressing the issue of trans European benefits.
ACTION:
· Voluntary investment co-ordination initiative (Article 129c, par. 2.)
· Evaluation of need to clarify State aid guidelines, particularly as regards ports and other
terminals.
· Revision of Regulation 1107/70 on State aids in inland transport.
15 See COM(97) 453 final, section 2.2
16 Member States shall, in liaison with the Commission, co-ordinate amongst themselves the policies pursued at
national level which may have a significant impact on the achievement of the objectives referred to in Article
129b. The Commission may, in close co-operation with the Member State, take any useful initiative to
promote such co-ordination.27
Summary: Community rules (and actions · · · ·) on infrastructure charging in transport
First (current) stage (1998-2000): define and
establish detailed charging approach.
Second Stage (2001-2004):
consolidate consistent
charging basis for road,
rail, airports and ports.
Third Stage: complete
transition. All modes
of transport subject to
t h es a m ec h a r g i n g
principles.
Committee of
Experts
· Make effective use of the Committee of
Governments experts on charging for the use
of transport infrastructure to assist the
Commission in the development of methods
to estimate marginal costs of transport,
promote the development of transport
accounts at Member State level, develop
accounting practices to safeguard cost
recovery for terminals, advice on statistics
and research needs and priorities.
As for phase one plus the
review of charging
practices.
Operate
Roads Promote road pricing. Specifically, allow
differentiation of charges on commercial
transports (e.g. vehicle type, marginal cost
related), but limited to average infr. Costs.
Communication on Interoperable electronic fee
collection systems in Europe.
· Set up an advisory group to develop a best
practice on motor liability insurance
schemes.
· Urban road pricing R&D.
· Demonstration projects, city road pricing.
· Facilitate the introduction of km charging for
HGVs.
Promotion of harmonised
electronic charging
schemes (e.g. EFC
schemes) Charge limit
raised to average infr.
Costs and external costs.
(structure based on
marginal infr. and external
costs).
· Further develop
possible schemes,
standards and
convergence proposals
for electronic charging
for HGVs.
· Follow up to liability
advisory group.
· Examine options for
reductions in transport
related charges and
other taxes.
Cost related charges
for commercial
operators mandatory.
Railways · Proposal for a Council Directive based on
distance related charging for marginal costs,
optional additional charges for passenger
services (maximum level: average costs),
and compensatory payments for uncovered
external costs of competing modes.
· Investigate possible
noise charges.
· Update, and
propose extension
of marginal cost
charging regime to
passenger rail
operators covering
infrastructure costs
and externalities.
Inland Waterways Infrastructure charging
directive covering
infrastructure costs
and externalities.28
First (current) stage (1998-2000): define and
establish detailed charging approach.
Second stage: consolidate
consistent charging basis
for road, rail, airports and
ports.
Third Stage: complete
transition. all modes of
transport subject to the
same charging
principles.
Air traffic
services
Current charges are (roughly) cost based and use
related.
· Communication on air transport and
environment.
· Communication on air transport market.
· Follow up to the study on taxation of
aviation fuel.
· Analyse possibilities to link en route charges
to pollution levels rather than develop a
separate scheme for the purpose.
· Green Paper on financing of air traffic
management infrastructure.
Charging directive
allowing charges for infr.
Costs and externalities
(although external costs
also proxied by airport
charges)
Update
Airports Infrastructure charging Directive making
charges cost related.
· Adoption of Council Directive on airport
charges.
· Communication on air transport and
environment.
· Communication on air transport market.
· Communication on airport capacity and
airport cost developments in the EU (inc.
policy options to relieve congestion).
Charging for external costs
becomes mandatory (e.g.
Swedish landing charges).
Update
Maritime
shipping
· Examination of options for reducing fuel
emissions.
· Improve international
standards.
· Community instrument
to implement standards.
Update
Ports and
maritime
infrastructure
· Inventory of public funding and charging
practices in ports.
Infrastructure charging
Directive, making charges
cost related, with marginal
costs related to both infr.
and external costs.
· Implement port
infrastructure charging
directive.
Update
State Aid Clarify and up date State aid rules permitting co-
ordination of inland transport under Article 77.
Exemptions, inter alia, for compensatory
payments for uncovered external costs of
competing modes.
· Modification of Regulation 1107/70 State
aid guidelines.
· Voluntary investment co-ordination
initiative.
· Evaluation of need to clarify State aid
guidelines.
Consider extension of
structure to all modes of
transport.
· Develop state aid
guidelines for ports and
airports.
Update
Energy
taxation/VAT
· Taxation should not distort transport
decisions or inhibit development of efficient
transport charges. Adoption of energy
taxation proposal
· Consultation paper, possibly followed by a
proposal for a Directive on VAT in transport
Further harmonisation. Further harmonisation.29
6S OCIO-ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGY
6(a) General economic effects
1. The development of a Community approach to transport charging based on efficient
charging levels is expected to provide significant net benefits for the whole of society. It
should lead directly to improved technological, operational, and organisational efficiency;
produce a small desirable change in modal balance, and a small reduction in the growth of
demand for mobility.17 The Commission has carried out numerous studies (for it) into the
effects of such charging systems on the economy, on industry, consumers and on cohesion and
peripheral regions18. The basic conclusions of such analyses is that efficient charging
frameworks would generally lead to benefits in terms of all these policy objectives, provided
revenues are put to efficient use.
2. From a general economic perspective, the long term effect of the policy is expected to
have little or no direct effect on GDP growth, but it permits secondary benefit through the
recycling of revenues. Moreover, since common charging rules would reduce potentially
harmful tax competition the restructuring of tax systems in order to reduce distortive taxes and
charges would be facilitated. Partly depending on related tax reforms a new charging system
would have a positive effect on employment when some revenues are redistributed as lower
labour taxes. Finally, by switching from taxes to charges, it should provide a clearer transport
revenue base, improving conditions for private investment and operation of infrastructure.
3. More specifically, the internalisation of environmental costs would increase efficiency
from an environmental perspective: when charges reflect the marginal costs of emissions, the
level of emissions should fall to the point where the cost of further abatement equals the
marginal benefit. Moreover by implementing more direct and distance related charges, each
trip is more likely to be assessed according to its own costs and benefits. As all costs would be
considered, each trip should provide a net benefit. So from a social perspective, welfare, not
the number of trips, is maximised.
4. From a financial perspective, the more efficient use of the transport system should
reduce the need for government expenditure on infrastructure, healthcare, and the
environment (although direct financial benefits should ideally be recycled via lower taxes).
The net effect on the commercial sector should be positive, as the direct effect of higher
transport charges are countered by reductions in costs associated with congestion and
accidents, and from any possible tax cuts made by governments. There may be some
shrinkage of transport intensive industries, but this would be small, as the overall price
increase in transport would be modest, and as firms would first adjust their logistics and
operations19.
5. For each mode, the relative price changes would differ from country to country
depending on cost structures as well as on the initial tax and charge structures. A Swedish
17 ECMT 1998.
18 See for example the analysis presented in the Green Paper on Fair and Efficient pricing (notably Chapter 8)
and the analysis presented in the explanatory memorandum of the Commission’s proposal on a modification
of the “Eurovignette” Directive (93/89/EC).
19 ECMT 1998.30
study20 has estimated the effects of the internalisation of marginal social costs of accident,
environmental, and infrastructure costs on the different modes of transport, given that existing
transport taxes are phased out. (Although importantly, the study does not consider congestion
costs and noise.) The study showed that when the marginal costs in question are internalised
and balanced by tax reductions, charges on petrol, cars and cargo vessel, would fall, and on
other modes should rise. The study concludes that the main effect would be to improve the
competitive position of shipping. The study also indicates that final transport prices would be
influenced less than the charges, as businesses would respond to the new charges by
modifying transport patterns and vehicle fleets – by reducing their costs, rather than passing
all the charge on to consumers.
6. To understand the impacts of the more obvious and likely changes to transport
charges, the Commission has undertaken a great deal of analysis through a number of studies
and research projects. The “TRENEN” project exams the implementation of efficient
charging regimes in four urban settings (Amsterdam, Brussels, Dublin and London) and two
inter urban settings (Belgium and Ireland). And the project “EUNET” studies the impacts of
different charging policies in London and the south east England, the Helsinki, Naples, and
Basque regions. The general finding of these studies is that net welfare improves for the
consumers in all four cities and in the two regions examined when efficient charging is
implemented. This happens because the benefits of the reduction in congestion and pollution
achieved, combined with the reimbursement of tax payments, outweighs the “loss” resulting
from the price increase of certain transport services.
7. In the urban studies, the price changes were found to induce positive technological
improvements, urban peak time traffic volumes fell by between 19% and 33%, and external
costs fell by between 13% and 35%. In the inter urban models, private car use decreases and
public transport use increases in London and south east England, and in the Basque region.
The number of traffic accidents falls by 20%, and the average time spent in a car in peak
periods falls by 16%. The EUNET and TRENEN studies indicate that introducing a policy of
marginal social cost charging at EU level could lead to overall welfare benefits of the order of
at least 30-80 billion ECU per year.
8. A further study of the Commission examines the introduction of one of the first
possible measures and priorities: a road freight tax across Europe. The study models the
introduction of charges based on the tonne-kilometres of HGVs throughout the European
Union21. In the model, the charges are introduced gradually to reflect the average external
costs of road freight, excluding congestion, and the revenues from the charge are returned to
the economy as reductions in labour taxes. The key results of the study reflect the impact of
the charge on a base line scenario for 2010:
· GDP increases by 0.3% and industrial production by 0.21%
· Employment increases by 0.5%
· Road freight traffic declines by 6.6%
20 Per Kageson, 1998.
21 B a r k e r ,Ta n dK ö h l e r ,J .T h eE Ui sd efined as the 12 EU countries of 1995 excluding Greece.31
9. By returning the charge revenues to the economy as reductions in labour taxes,
production, employment, and economic growth are all encouraged, and these effects outweigh
the impact of higher road transport costs.
6(b) Distributional effects
10. The aim of changes to transport charges is to improve the efficiency of the transport
sector. If this leads to an undesirable distributional effect, then there is a need to offer a
compensating policy. In general however, “consumption” of transport is generally progressive,
that is, richer households spend more of their income on transport. Consequently, a rise in
transport charges may have a progressive, rather than regressive distributional effect22.T h e
final distributive effect however, would very much depend on which sectors or types of
transport face increased costs, and what type of compensatory package is offered by the
Member State. Finally, the above-mentioned study on effects of the introduction of a road
freight tax suggests that such a charging scheme would have positive effects for all income
groups. The real personal disposable income would rise for every socio-economic group.
6(c) Cohesion and peripheral regions
11. The effect of changes in transport prices on peripheral or less developed areas also
needs to be examined. Such charges would be differentiated so that regions with less
congestion and pollution would be less affected. Where there is little infrastructure and
congestion in rural or peripheral regions, charges reflecting these costs would, therefore, be
low, so there is no reason to believe that, as a general rule, peripheral and less developed
regions would be adversely affected by the application of a marginal cost charging scheme.
Moreover, as highlighted above, the system is likely to generate significant overall benefits
which would also accrue to economically less developed regions.
12. In those instances where there is some concern that certain higher transport user
charges could impede the economic development of peripheral or economically less
developed regions or , there may be a case for flexible and very gradual implementation of
price reforms, provided it does not result in distortion of competition. This may particularly be
the case where certain facilities are the only link to the rest of the Union and/or constitute a
significant centre of activity for the local economy On the other hand, where the level of
transport infrastructure is relatively poor, and sizeable investment is needed to improve
accessibility and/or meet forecast increases in traffic, there may be a need for charging
strategies that lead to a higher degree of cost-recovery.
13. Differentiated pricing systems will result in a shift in the pattern and distribution of
transport costs. By improving efficiency, it will lead to reduced transport costs for the whole
of society. It will also lead to reduced direct costs for some producers. However, for those
producers that are not able to adjust sufficiently their behaviour in response to the new pricing
systems, transport costs may rise. As already mentioned, transport costs are in general a small
proportion of overall production costs. However, at least in the short term, such producers
could be particularly affected if they are located in peripheral areas, dependent on a single
mode of transport, and selling over long distances to the major markets at the centre in
competition with local producers. This may justify the introduction in the Community
framework of specific provisions aimed at addressing this problem. In addition to that, whilst
22 (partly depending on the type of increase), R Iten et al. 1998.32
respecting State Aid rules, some peripheral regions may therefore wish to take steps to
promote the competitive position of such producers in central markets, for example, by
helping them to adapt production structures in favour of products with higher value to weight
ratios and by improving the quality and diversity of major transport systems, supported where
appropriate by the Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund.
7C ONCLUSION
1. The Commission’s proposed three phase approach to fair and efficient charging in
transport would ensure that an efficient, cost related approach is taken to charging for
infrastructure use, in all Member States, and across modes. Using a “Committee of
government experts”, the Commission would develop detailed and practical guidance on best
practice for charging for infrastructure use, congestion, and external costs, and new or
amended legislation (outlined in 4.1) would ensure that this consistent approach is adopted
(by 2004 for priority modes, and shortly thereafter for all modes). By ensuring that charges are
based on specific and agreed costs, the Commission expects that a general understanding of
the need to link charging for use to cost would become accepted, and the efficiency of the
European transport sector would improve as a consequence.33
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Glossary
Average costs Average costs consist of the total costs of infrastructure divided by a measure of output, such
as vehicle-kms or flight hours. They therefore show the costs of road provision per unit of
traffic. They are particularly relevant for cost-recovery, since prices which are set equal to
average costs will ensure that total costs are recovered (because total costs include both fixed
and variable costs).
Capital costs Capital costs comprise the consumption of fixed capital and interest payments, and often
represent a high share of total infrastructure costs. They are different from annual capital
expenditure, which may or may not cover all the costs. (If expenditure is less than the costs,
the quality and value of the infrastructure will deteriorate.
Congestion Congestion arises when traffic exceeds infrastructure capacity and the speed of traffic
declines. It can be defined as a situation where traffic is slower than it would be if traffic flows
were at low levels. The definition of these “low levels” (reference level) is complicated and
varies from country to country.
Congestion
costs
Congestion costs comprise direct costs (time costs, operating costs) and indirect costs (the
opportunity cost of the time lost, costs occurred to third parties due to delayed deliveries of
goods, environmental costs).
Cost approach The cost-based approach to measuring infrastructure finances is to determine values for the
capital (using depreciation methods) and operational structures. (The alternative is an
expenditure based approach).
Cost recovery This is an approach to infrastructure charging whereby the costs of infrastructure (fixed and
variable) are recovered in full or partially, through infrastructure charges. Such an approach is
usually based on costs and helps raise revenue for the investment and provision of
infrastructure.
Cost relatedness This is a term developed in Article 4 of the proposal for a Council Directive on airport
charges, and applies generally to terminals. It means that charges should as a minimum
recover marginal costs, and the operator should be able to demonstrate that charges are related
to marginal costs. It also relates to cost recovery, as it implies that operators may add
additional non-distorting charges in order to achieve (up to) full cost recovery.
Depreciation Depreciation is an accounting charge for the decline in value of an asset spread over its
economic life (life expectancy). The depreciation is a part of deriving capital costs from
existing road capital values.
Expenditure
approach
Some Member States assess infrastructure values on the basis of their annual expenditure on
infrastructure. This will often include both annual investment (for new infrastructure and for
enlargement and replacement of assets, and not capitalised) and running costs (for
maintenance, operation and administration). For assessing transport finances, a cost approach
is preferable.
External costs External costs are those costs which the user of a good or service (such as infrastructure) does
not pay for. they include infrastructure use where use is free, damage, pollution, noise, health
costs associated with transport use and accidents. Failure to acknowledge such costs results in
excessive use of the good or service.
Fixed costs Fixed costs are those costs which are independent of the flow of traffic. (Including
infrastructure building, lighting).
Flat rate charge A charge for the use of infrastructure, often used in conjunction with variable charges, which
does not vary with use. Annual license fees, entrance fees or access charges are all examples
of flat rate charges. (Synonymous with fixed rate charge.)
Harmonisation. The co-ordination and possible merging between states of regulations, codes of conduct,
methods of estimating costs, vehicle classifications, sign posting etc.
Internal costs Internal costs are those which the user pays for.36
Interest Interest charges are a part of the capital costs of infrastructure. They reflect the opportunity
cost of capital (if not invested in infrastructure the funds could be invested elsewhere in the
country). The interest rate is usually comparable with the refinancing cost for governmental
loans.
Investment
expenditure
This reflects yearly expenditure for infrastructure with durable characteristics - with a lifetime
of more than one year (for example new construction of infrastructure). Such expenditure has
to be “capitalised” with a depreciation rate and an interest rate reflecting the opportunity cost
for the capital invested.
Maintenance Maintenance costs reflect the costs which are necessary to maintain existing infrastructure.
One can distinguish between ordinary maintenance, for example cleaning and winter
maintenance which is independent of use, and maintenance which is dependent on traffic
volume (e.g. surface dressing). Being both variable and traffic dependent, these latter
maintenance costs are marginal costs.
Marginal costs Marginal costs are specific variable costs relating to the use of existing infrastructure (without
considering a capacity increase). They reflect the additional costs of an additional vehicle or
other transport unit, and include use related infrastructure maintenance and operating costs.
When the marginal cost term is used in this paper it refers to social short run marginal costs,
which are specific variable costs relating to the use of existing infrastructure (without
considering a capacity increase). Long run marginal costs additionally include the costs of
future increases in capacity. They are, however, very difficult to measure in transport.
Moreover, linking charges to long run marginal costs would lead to significant inefficiencies
in transport use during periods where capacity increases are not considered. This is why most
economists agree that short run marginal cost pricing is more appropriate for transport.
Operating costs
or expenditure
These are expenditures which are necessary to operate existing infrastructure (administration,
police, traffic signals, cleaning). These costs are running costs and thus do not have to be
capitalised.
Purchase costs The costs of buying a good or service.
Replacement
value/ cost
The cost of replacing a particular asset of a particular quality with an asset of equivalent
quality. Replacement cost may exceed the original purchase cost because of changes in the
prices of the assets.
Running costs The costs necessary to keep a particular asset in operation, but which do not enhance the value
of the asset. For infrastructure, running cost expenditures will be those annual expenditures
necessary to ensure that the infrastructure provides an acceptable quality of service (including
operating costs), but do not maintain that quality beyond a limited period of time. They
include items such as: sweeping and cleaning; cutting of grass verges; winter maintenance
(snow clearing and gritting); lighting; and policing.
Standardisation Fixing of uniform technical approaches, technologies and standards amongst Member States.
Structural
maintenance
Maintenance of a capital nature. A good example of structural maintenance is the
reconstruction of road pavements and resurfacing. The benefits of this expenditure are
received over a number of years, rather than just in the year in which the road pavement is
improved.
sunk costs The cost of assets which have exceeded their official lifetime and so have no formal capital or
re-sale value left is said to be zero.
total costs The sum of fixed costs and variable costs, or of capital costs and running costs. Total costs
therefore give the total annual cost of providing the infrastructure.
Variable costs Those costs which vary with traffic levels. Examples of variable costs include wear-and-tear
to infrastructure, congestion costs.37
Annex I : Different infrastructure charging approaches
Marginal cost charging
Marginal costs are specific variable costs relating to the use of existing infrastructure (without considering a
capacity increase). They reflect the additional costs of an additional vehicle or other transport unit, and
include use related infrastructure maintenance and operating costs.
In the long term (e.g. 50 years) all costs (even investment and capital costs) become variable, and so
marginal costs tend to converge with average costs (because the distinction between fixed and variable costs
is abolished). When the policy focus is efficient use of existing infrastructure however, it is the short run
version of marginal costs which is important.
Whilst MC charging will lead to efficient use of infrastructure, for sectors with economies of scale (such as
railways) it will not recover all costs. Second, other objectives such as development, safety and mobility
may lead to investments above the theoretical optimum and so marginal cost charging may again, not cover
all costs. Third, stepped, rather than finely graded charges are all that is feasible at the moment, so marginal
costs may not be perfectly reflected. (See charge discrimination.) Fourth, imperfect markets elsewhere, may
call for the implementation of an adjusted marginal cost scheme.
Average cost charging
Average costs consist of the total costs of infrastructure divided by a measure of output, such as vehicle-kms
or flight hours. They therefore show the costs of road provision per unit of traffic. They are particularly
relevant for cost-recovery, since prices which are set equal to average costs will ensure that total costs are
recovered (because total costs include both fixed and variable costs).
Whilst average cost charging is a good simple approach, it can lead to significant inefficiency, with some
transport users paying too much (when their marginal costs are low, such as small passenger cars), and some
too little.
Ramsey pricing
This theory suggests that the degree to which a firm raises prices above marginal costs should depend on the
sensitivity of demand to changes in price (its elasticity). It is better to raise the price of a product where
demand is insensitive to either its price or the price of other goods, than to impose the increase on a good,
demand for which will change significantly with the price change. For infrastructure, demand for passenger
transport is less elastic than for freight. So Ramsey pricing implies that passenger transport prices should be
higher and a producer can cover more of his costs and limit the efficiency losses. Such analysis however
presupposes market segmentation is possible and acceptable, and does not take account of income
distribution or wider welfare effects.
Price discrimination
According to this strategy users are charged differently depending on their willingness to pay. Users with
marginal benefits considerably higher than the marginal cost are also charged more, while users with a low
valuation are charged for their marginal cost. In practice however it is very hard to design such schemes.
One problem is that users have no reason to reveal their real willingness to pay. Charge schemes based on
negotiation is a theoretical possibility but may conflict with the principle of transparent charges. It may also
be questioned whether such approaches are fair.
Two part tariffs
In a two part tariff scheme marginal cost charging can be combined with a flat rate charge such as those
commonly in use (e.g. registration fees), to help cover costs. Decisions about individual journeys are taken
according to marginal costs, a flat rate charge has the potential to raise extra revenues without distorting
efficiencies. However if the charge does affect decisions, by lowering incomes or changing perceptions of
the cost of transport, it will also distort the market.38
Annex II: Existing approaches to infrastructure charging
The following table indicates the disparity in the size of charges between modes for fuel
taxation charges:
Table 1. Fuel excise duties in the EU, across modes, January 1997, ECU.
Mode Leaded petrol kilolitres (kl) Unleaded petrol kl Diesel kl LPG/ tonne CNG/methane tonne
Motor fuel, lowest 396 349 252 0 0
Motor fuel highest 617 576 501 776 776
Aviation fuel 0 for international flights
Rail (mineral oil) varies across Member States*
Shipping 0 00 0 0
Inland waterways 0 on the Rhine (where over 70% of European traffic takes place)
* A ,D ,G ,L :M o t o rf u e lr a t e ; P ,S ,D K ,I :e x e m p t ; U K,I r e :h e a t i n gf u e lr a t e Source: DGXXI
Road
Community legislation adopted in 199223, fixed minimum rates for excise duties levied on
road fuel throughout the Community. A year later24 the 93/89/EEC Directive set a framework
of rules concerning vehicle taxes and road specific charges (such as tolls and user charges)
levied on HGVs.
The taxation of road traffic differs considerably between Member States, as the following tables
show. As illustrated in table 2 a few Member States tax diesel fuel only slightly above this
level (Luxembourg; Greece; and Spain). The table illustrates considerable differences among
Member States.
Table 2: Excise duties on diesel fuel, as of January 1998, ECU.
Member State 1000 l
EC MINIMUM 245
LOWEST TAX RATE 248
HIGHEST TAX RATE 585
DIFFERENCE 333
Table 3 illustrates the types of vehicle tax structures across the EU. Whilst there is some
commonality of structure across Member States, tax levels differ by very large margins.
23 Council Directive 92/82/EEC, O.J. L 316/19 of 31.10.1992
24 Council Directive 93/89/EEC, O.J. L 279/32 of 12.11.199339
Table 3: HGV taxes in Member States as of 1 January 1998.
Annual
taxes
Taxes on motoring
Member State Vehicle
tax
Excise
duty on
motor
fuels +
VAT
Tolls on
roads or
bridges
User
charges
(Euro-
vignette
etc.)
Belgium * * *
Germany * * *
Denmark * * * *
Spain * * *
Greece * * *
France * * *
Italy * * *
Ireland * * *
1
Luxembourg * * *
Netherlands * * *
Austria * * *
Portugal * * *
Finland * *
Sweden * * * *
United Kingdom * * *
1) Tolls applied so far are private charges rather than taxes.
Table 4 covers HGVs as well as passenger cars and indicates the different emphasis placed on
different forms of charge. Some of this variation may not distort, and merely reflects differences
in costs. However it is unlikely that the variations discussed above are deliberate, or that they
reflect different cost structures.
Table 4: Comparison of taxes levied on all road transport
1 (1993,1995, or 1996) %.
Country Fuel Vehicle Tolls
Austria 62% 32% 6%
Finland 55% 45% -
Germany 83% 17% -
Italy 67% 32% 1%
Portugal 73% 21% 6%
Spain 83% 8.5% 8.5%
UK 80% 20% -
1 All road vehicles. Proportion of taxes collected, excluding revenues from the Eurovignette user charge. Fuel taxes exclude VAT;
vehicle taxes comprise annual vehicle taxes and purchase taxes. Source: DGVII 1998.
Rail
Council Directive 95/19/EC contains broad rules which set the Community framework
governing the charging of railway infrastructure fees. There are substantial differences
between the approaches to rail infrastructure charging adopted so far by individual Member
States. Systems vary from a tariff matrix, two part tariffs, social marginal cost charging,
elements of negotiation, to zero charges. The systems reflect significant differences between
the market structures and the nature of the rail network in each Member State, and also clear40
differences between government policies in relation to public transport and the availability of
public funds. Nevertheless, most of the existing charging frameworks can be assigned to one
of two broad approaches:
· the “Scandinavian” approach, which features a relatively simple charging system, based
on SRMC, but adjusted to take account of more general transport policy priorities;
· the “Adjusted Average Cost” approach, which seeks to raise a target amount of revenue,
mainly through variable charges. Although these variable charges may be adjusted to
reflect a number of cost and market factors, and a small proportion of revenues may be
raised through flat rate charges, this approach often leads to variable charges which are
substantially higher than SRMCs, depending also on the level of state contributions (if
any) available.
A key difference between these two approaches is the direction of the causal relationship
between state contributions to rail infrastructure and the level of infrastructure charges. Under
the Scandinavian approach, the level of infrastructure charges (and hence the total income
from these charges) is determined mainly by cost conditions and comparisons with other
modes of transport, so that the level of state contributions required is then determined by the
difference between total rail infrastructure costs and the revenue raised from infrastructure
charges. In contrast, under the Adjusted Average Cost approach, the amount of state
contribution (if any) to rail infrastructure is generally determined in relation to wider decisions
on public spending priorities, and infrastructure charges therefore need to generate sufficient
revenues to cover the difference between state contributions and total infrastructure costs.
The approach adopted in Great Britain does not fit easily into either of these categories. It
combines the focus on SRMCs of the Scandinavian approach with the high degree of cost
recovery more typical of the Adjusted Average Cost approach. Alone among the Member
States, some access charges in Great Britain are determined by negotiation between train
operators and the infrastructure manager, and the charging framework in Great Britain also
appears to be significantly more complex than those applied in many other Member States.
The following tables roughly summarises the differing financial situation of railways in
Member States, and the different charging approaches applied by Member States:
Table 5. Rail transport costs and subsidies 1989 (£M, 1989).
Country Total cost of railways Total government subsidy Ratio of “revenues”
1 to cost
GB 3,591 636 82%
France 6,201 3,194 48%
W Germany 8,763 3,611 59%
Italy 7,226 6,059 16%
Belgium 1,309 761 42%
Holland 834 377 55%
1 revenues=costs-subsidy. Source: OEIL 199741
Table 6. Indicative railway charges in various Member States (ECU, 1997).
Country Annual Charge Distance Charge Weight Charge Cost coverage
Austria 9,700-18,900/km 0.73 /train km 0.001/tkm 26%
Belgium ·
Denmark 200-400/km
1 2.7-3/trainkm 20-25%
Finland 0.0015-0.0017/gross tkm 15%
France 38-1,680/km 0.13-15/trainkm
2
Germany 2.5-12.6/trainkm
3
Sweden · 0.0027-0.1 /train km
UK ··
1 From 1999 2 varying with time of travel 3 varying with route Source: NERA 1998
(In remaining Member States, railway infrastructure charges are not yet developed.)
Inland waterways
Roughly 7.6% of European transport occurs using inland waterways. Of this, over 70% of
traffic occurs on the Rhine, where, under the Mannheim Convention, charges are prohibited.
For most other waterways, Member States levy charges on a variety of principles.
In contrast to the Mannheim Convention, several Member States (Luxembourg, France,
Germany (under the Mosel convention), Belgium, Finland, the UK (largely for leisure craft)
and The Netherlands), apply quite sophisticated charges, levied according to type and size of
vessel, type and volume of cargo, number of passengers, frequency of travel, and time of day
(each country has its own particular approach). The charges contribute to a variety of
maintenance, operating, and capital costs, but demand appears to be quite sensitive to changes
in the charge, and so charges are difficult to raise.
In Germany, fewer charges are levied, with no navigation charges applied on the Rhine, the
Elbe, the Oder or the Danube. On other waterways (with considerably less than 20% of all
traffic) charges are levied (for example, under the Mosel convention) similar to those
described above. Such charges recover up to 25% of the operating and maintenance costs of
the waterways.
Some countries (particularly France and the UK) charge other users of the canal networks
(non transport users such as water companies, industrial and agricultural users). These
organisations make more use of the canal than transport (the split is roughly 80/20) and in
these countries, contribute significantly to the costs of the infrastructure. By and large, charges
for the use of inland waterways in Member States contribute to but do not cover variable
infrastructure costs. Government subsidies are still required to some extent in all Member
States.
The following table summarises the different approaches applied in different Member states:42
Table 7. Inland waterway costs and cost recovery, 1998.
Country Type of charge Recovery of costs Note
Belgium variable
1 7.5% of investment . It should be borne in mind that
France Variable 10% of receipts . only 20% of the use of inland
Germany Variable for 20% of traffic 13% of running costs . water ways is thought to be
UK Variable 8.75% of maintenance costs attributable to navigation.
Finland Variable 21% of maintenance and
development costs
1 variable charges tend to change according to weight, distance, boat type, type of travel Source: DGVII Questionnaire.
Airports
Airport charging systems cover a wide variety of charges related to different airport facilities
and services. These include landing, lighting, parking, refuelling and storage facilities as well
as aircraft, passenger and freight services. As there is no standard use for the different airport
charges, they do not always cover identical facilities or services. Airport charges are based on a
number of criteria, which vary from one charging system to another. Some criteria, however,
are in common use. These include:
· the origin or destination of the flight, with frequent distinction between domestic and
international flights for landing, passenger and lighting charges;
· the mass of the aircraft, often the maximum take-off weight, for landing and
parking charges;
· the noise category of the aircraft for the noise charge or, if no such charge exists, for the
landing charge when modulated according to the noise emissions of the aircraft;
· the parking time, sometimes modulated in accordance with the flight schedule, for the
parking charge;
· the number of passengers, their age and sometimes the distance flown for the passenger
charge;
· the freight tonnage loaded or unloaded for the freight charge.
The level of airport charges varies significantly from one Member State to another and often
even from one airport to another within a single Member State.
Air traffic services
The overall EUROCONTROL charge exacted by a State equates to the sum of individual
charges for flights which have entered the airspace of that State. The individual charge for a
flight is calculated by multiplying the national unit rate of charge by the number of "service
units" of that flight. For each country, the national unit rate of charge is fixed each year by
dividing the national en-route facility “cost-base” by the total number of "service units" in that
country's airspace in that year. The calculation of "service units" is a function of the distance
flown by an aircraft (expressed in terms of one hundredths of the great circle distance between43
the point of entry into the country's airspace and the point of exit from it) multiplied by the
weight factor of the aircraft (expressed as the square root of its maximum certified take-off
weight). "Unit rates of charge" for a year are fixed at the end of the previous year, on the basis
of actual costs. There is a mechanism that allows any consequent disparities to be adjusted
subsequently. Finally, these values must refer only to chargeable flights. (Some flights are
usually exempted - such as those by aircraft under 2 tons, State aircraft, search and rescue
flights, military flights, training flights, and navaid check flights.)
The calculation of the “cost-base” is made in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles for investment expenditure and operating costs. Investment expenditure, on
equipment and buildings, is taken into account by amortising its final cost on the basis of its
expected operating life. The two components of this cost are depreciation (the amount of
capital actually in service); and interest (which is related to the net value, in terms of cost -
depreciation, of the capital invested). Operating costs are those for air traffic services,
communications, meteorological services, aeronautical information services, each classified in
terms of maintenance, operations, training, research and administration. All charges are levied
by EUROCONTROL and redistributed to the Member States according to traffic volumes.
The present approach reflects the reality of production costs and enables their full recovery.
Sea ports
The sea ports sector often functions on commercial lines, and has a high degree of
competition: sea ports both within one Member State and in different Member States compete
strongly for customers. There is a discernible trend towards even greater private participation
in port activities, particularly those of a predominantly commercial nature such as cargo
handling. As a result, financing of port facilities for such purposes is increasingly becoming
the responsibility of the private sector, while the port authorities tend to restrict themselves
more and more to their “landlord” role and the financing and operation of those facilities
which are essential to the safe and efficient operation of the port as a whole.
Charging systems in the Community differ considerably between European sea ports. They
nevertheless include certain basic elements such as a description of the port facility and
services covered by each type of port charge, the basis of the individual charges and the
method of calculation. In general, three types of payment can be distinguished25 - those related
to the provision of services and facilities to enable a ship to enter safely and use the port;
payments for specific services or supplies rendered; and rents or charges for the use of land or
equipment owned by the port.
Most sea ports charge for goods loaded and unloaded and some also charge for vehicles and
passengers using the port. Revenue is earned by renting out equipment, buildings and land to
port operators and from the direct provision of services. In most countries, port dues and
charges are still subject to approval by the Government or Municipal Authorities. However,
the general aim for most sea ports, both public and private, is to ensure that sea ports cover
their costs.
25 ESPO, 1996.44
Maritime shipping
There are no charges for operating ships on the open sea, however some Member States
charge for fairway use. From 1 January 1998 Sweden has introduced environmentally
differentiated fairway charges.45
Annex III: Marginal Social Cost Charging and Recovery of Capital Costs
Marginal costs charges are not directly related to fixed infrastructure costs. However, when
the provision of infrastructure is efficient, then, provided a number of conditions are met,
fixed costs can be covered by the congestion or scarcity component of the marginal social cost
charges.
From an efficiency perspective and on the basis of a social cost/benefit evaluation of
infrastructure projects, it is seldom justified to build capacity to provide free flow conditions
(available capacity) also during peak-hours. Indeed capacity should be geared towards normal
demand levels. The incremental benefits of avoiding congestion at all moments of the
day/year would, typically, be lower than the additional costs of the required infrastructure
investments. In other words, the efficient provision of infrastructure normally implies some
scarcity and congestion during certain periods.
The proposed charging approach would comprise a congestion/scarcity element. Since these
charging components do not reflect any out of pocket spending for infrastructure operators,
they can be used to finance fixed costs. Congestion charges would generally make up for fixed
infrastructure costs in such an optimal system if there are constant returns to scale (implying
that average costs would equal marginal costs and that marginal cost based charges would
fully recover fixed costs). However, the existence of economies of scale and indivisibilities
may complicate the situation.
Economies of scale imply that the unit costs of providing capacity decrease the more capacity
is provided, implying that the marginal costs are below the average costs. Indivisibilities, on
the other hand, mean that there is a limited flexibility to chose capacity levels. For example,
the options are to build a single or a double rail track, but there are no possibilities to choose
intermediary capacity levels. Due to conditions of this kind an efficiently designed
infrastructure may be characterised by capacity levels where there is no scope for congestion
or scarcity charging to fully recover fixed costs. On the contrary, decreasing returns to scale
(marginal costs above average costs), which are typically found in densely populated areas,
physical limits on expanding capacity or situations where indivisibilities lead to relatively low
levels of capacity would imply congestion charges that are relatively high and typically
recover more than full cost.
The different transport modes cannot be easily classified on the basis of the different cases
discussed above and there is a significant variation between projects. However, in very
general terms, it can be concluded that large parts of the road infrastructure, larger airports and
air traffic services often tend to face constant returns to scale, whilst rail infrastructure and
inland waterways are characterised by economies of scale. This is one reason for expecting
lower levels of cost recovery from rail and inland waterways than from roads and aviation.
All in all it is clear that marginal infrastructure cost charging (including a congestion/scarcity
element, but excluding external costs) will not always imply cost recovery for all parts of the
network in question, but under-recovery for some parts would generally balance over-recovery
for others. This balance is particularly obvious concerning roads. Research funded by the
Commission for instance suggests that marginal cost charges would demand price increases in
the order of 200 per cent on some urban roads in Belgium and cover far more than the total
costs of these roads. At the same time it is clear that marginal cost charging would lead to very
limited contributions to fixed costs in sparsely populated rural areas.46
This paper indicates that revenues from the scarcity component of marginal social cost
charging could be used to cross-finance infrastructure through infrastructure funds at modal,
regional or national levels. Moreover, it has also been pointed out that evidence suggests that
marginal infrastructure cost charging is likely to lead to high levels of cost recovery at the
level of the transport sector as a whole. From an infrastructure financing point of view, this
represents an important improvement over the existing situation.
The charging components for other externalities would lead to additional revenues. As
indicated in the main text, seen from an equity perspective, it may be desirable to use the
money to compensate individuals who are affected or to finance measures to limit future
impacts. But, of course, if these funds were in stead allocated for general infrastructure
purposes even higher rates of cost recovery would be achieved. The analysis presented in Roy
(1998) suggests that total revenues for the transport system as a whole would outstrip
infrastructure costs.